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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court launched a criminal-procedure 
revolution.1
 
* Elizabeth Stevens is currently an associate attorney at Parravano Witten PC in Monterey, 
California.  I am grateful to Professor Ruth Hargrove of California Western School of Law and 
Richard Katskee of the U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights, both of whom read 
drafts of this Article prior to submission, for their insightful comments and advice.  I also wish to 
thank the staff of the Akron Journal of Constitutional Law and Policy for their tireless efforts in 
shaping the Article for publication. 
  With its decision in Crawford v. Washington, the Court 
 1. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  See, e.g., United States v. Acosta, 475 
F.3d 677, 680 (5th Cir. 2007) (Crawford “fundamentally altered the role of the Confrontation 
Clause”); United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 671 (6th Cir. 2004) (Crawford “introduced a 
fundamental reconception of the Confrontation Clause”); Thomas F. Burke III, The Test Results 
Said What? The Post-Crawford Admissibility of Hearsay Forensic Evidence, 53 S.D. L. REV. 1, 1 
(2008) (Crawford “dramatically upset th[e] evidentiary landscape”); Richard D. Friedman, 
STEVENS_CONLAW_2010-2011.DOC 6/2/2011  1:50 PM 
82 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLICY [2:81 
radically reinterpreted the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, 
which secures a criminal defendant’s right “to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him.”2  Before, when a prosecution witness was 
unavailable for cross-examination by the accused at trial, the witness’s 
out-of-court statements could still be admitted for their truth if the trial 
judge found them sufficiently reliable.3  After Crawford, if such hearsay 
statements are comparable to in-court testimony, or “testimonial,” they 
are admissible only if the accused had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine the witness.4  Five years later, in Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, the Court applied this rule to forensic evidence, holding 
that certificates of analysis—used in a drug trial to prove the nature and 
weight of the proscribed substances, and sworn to and signed by the 
analysts who performed the tests—are testimonial.5
The facts of the case were prosaic.  Boston police arrested Luis 
Melendez-Diaz in a Kmart parking lot after a store employee whom 
Melendez-Diaz and a companion had picked up in a car dropped four 
plastic bags of white powder as he stepped out.
  This decision 
heralds dramatic change for the Confrontation Clause and for criminal 
trials. 
6
 
Crawford, Davis, and Way Beyond, 15 J. L. & POL’Y 553, 554 (2007) (Crawford “changed the 
landscape dramatically”). 
  En route to the police 
station, the officers noticed Melendez-Diaz, his companion, and the 
hapless Kmart employee “fidgeting and making furtive movements” in 
 2. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 3. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (“[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for 
cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is 
unavailable.  Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’  
Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted 
hearsay exception.  In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”). 
 4. 541 U.S. at 68.  In interpreting the Confrontation Clause, both Roberts and Crawford refer 
to “hearsay” and “unavailability,” terms defined in most evidence codes.  See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 
801 (defining “hearsay” and associated terms); FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (defining “unavailable”).  
Roberts aligned the constitutional standard for admission of hearsay with the evidentiary one.  See 
448 U.S. at 66 (holding that admission of hearsay statements does not offend the Confrontation 
Clause if the statements fall within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception”); FED R. EVID. 802 (making 
hearsay generally inadmissible); FED. R. EVID. 803 (listing exceptions to Rule 802); FED. R. EVID. 
804 (also listing exceptions to Rule 802).  Crawford makes clear that the Confrontation Clause is 
concerned with only a subset of hearsay statements, and that the Rules of Evidence do not delineate 
which statements fall within this sphere.  See 541 U.S. at 53-54, 56 (explaining that the Clause 
proscribes admission of “testimonial” hearsay absent declarant unavailability and a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination, regardless of whether or not a hearsay exception applies). 
 5. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009). 
 6. Id. at 2530. 
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the back seat of the police cruiser.7  The officers subsequently 
discovered nineteen additional bags, apparently containing the same 
substance as the first four, “hidden in the partition between the front and 
back seats.”8  They sent the bags to a state laboratory, where analysts 
tested the bags’ contents and found cocaine.9
At Melendez-Diaz’s trial for cocaine distribution and trafficking, 
the analysts did not appear.  Instead, the prosecution offered the seized 
bags into evidence along with three “certificates of analysis.”
 
10  The 
certificates, to which the analysts at the laboratory swore before a notary 
public, recited the weight and contents (cocaine) of the substances in the 
bags.11  Melendez-Diaz objected that the Confrontation Clause entitled 
him to cross-examine the certificates’ authors, but the trial court 
nonetheless admitted the certificates “pursuant to state law as ‘prima 
facie evidence of the composition, quality, and . . . net weight of the 
narcotic analyzed.’”12  The jury found Melendez-Diaz guilty, and 
because the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had held that 
certificates of forensic analysis were non-testimonial—such that under 
Crawford, defendants had no right to cross-examine their authors—the 
state appellate courts affirmed his conviction.13
In the U.S. Supreme Court, the case triggered a three-way doctrinal 
split among the Justices.  For the five-member majority, the conclusion 
that the certificates were testimonial followed logically from Crawford: 
as affidavits, they were functionally equivalent to in-court testimony.
 
14  
Hence, they were inadmissible absent either in-court testimony by their 
authors or a showing by the prosecution of unavailability and a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.15  Although Justice Thomas joined 
the majority, he wrote separately to emphasize his continued adherence 
to an independent interpretation of the Confrontation Clause—in effect, 
Crawford-plus—under which a statement must also be solemn, or 
“formalized,” to trigger the confrontation right.16
 
 7. Id.  
  In dissent, four 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 2530-31. 
 10. Id. at 2531. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 111, § 13 (2008)). 
 13. Id. (noting that Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701 (Mass. 2005) held that “the 
authors of certificates of forensic analysis are not subject to confrontation under the Sixth 
Amendment”).  Before Melendez-Diaz, state and lower federal courts had split as to whether 
forensic reports were testimonial under Crawford.  See infra note 77. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id.  
 16. See id. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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Justices attacked the majority’s conclusion on doctrinal and policy 
grounds.  Alleging that the Court had misread both the Confrontation 
Clause and Crawford, they advanced a competing interpretation of the 
constitutional text.17  Melendez-Diaz thus leaves the basic Crawford rule 
without majority support.  Accordingly, it represents a turning point in 
the Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence 
Concerns about Crawford’s real-world impact appear to have 
sparked this rupture.  The certificates in Melendez-Diaz recited the 
results of routine controlled substance analyses, but the opinion’s logic 
sweeps broadly, embracing other forms of forensic evidence.
and the beginning of a 
retreat from Crawford. 
18  Given 
both the frequency with which prosecutors offer forensic analyses 
through documents or the testimony of surrogate experts,19
This article will analyze Melendez-Diaz’s implications for the 
Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and for the criminal justice 
system.  In Part II, I focus on doctrine, analyzing the decision and 
exploring what the dueling opinions tell us about the meaning of the 
Confrontation Clause and the future of Crawford.  In Part III, I turn to 
the decision’s real-world impact, outlining its costs and benefits as 
predicted by the majority and dissent, and explaining why neither 
opinion gets its cost-benefit analysis quite right. 
 and the 
obvious logistical obstacles to making forensic analysts regularly 
available for live testimony, Melendez-Diaz could fundamentally alter 
how prosecutors build and present criminal cases.  The decision will 
undoubtedly impose significant practical costs, but its corresponding 
benefit—an increase in verdict reliability in cases involving forensic 
evidence—counterbalances those costs. 
II.  DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS 
Melendez-Diaz exposed sharp divisions among the Justices over 
Confrontation Clause doctrine.  The majority characterized its decision 
 
 17. See id. at 2551-52 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (contending that the Clause applies only to 
statements of witnesses who have perceived events giving them “personal knowledge of some 
aspect of the defendant’s guilt”). 
 18. See id. at 2536-38 (majority opinion) (discussing utility of confrontation in assessing 
reliability of forensic evidence generally and mentioning several other forensic disciplines). 
 19. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence and the Confrontation Clause After Crawford 
v. Washington, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 791, 797, 805 (2007) (noting that “expert evidence is sometimes 
introduced without any live testimony at all,” and that “[o]n many occasions, the forensic expert 
who testifies in court is not the person who actually conducted the forensic tests in the case”). 
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as “a straightforward application of . . . Crawford,”20 but the four 
dissenters emphatically disagreed.21  Moreover, Justice Thomas 
concurred separately to explain that he had joined the majority only 
because its holding accorded with his own, distinct view of the 
Confrontation Clause.22
A. Dueling Definitions  
  In this Part, I first outline the majority’s 
reasoning and the dissent’s proposed alternative.  I then examine their 
dispute concerning the Framers’ intent and Crawford’s holding, as well 
as the significance of Justice Thomas’s concurrence.  Finally, I 
synthesize the Court’s recent Confrontation Clause decisions to 
determine what Melendez-Diaz signals about the future of Crawford. 
For the majority, Melendez-Diaz was an easy case, and Justice 
Scalia’s opinion for the Court reads like a mathematical proof:  
(1) The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right 
“‘to be confronted with the witnesses against [them].’”23
(2) Crawford construed the term “witnesses” to mean those “who 
‘bear testimony’” against a defendant.
 
24  Thus, the Clause forbids the 
admission of testimony—or “testimonial” statements—against a 
defendant unless the witness “appears at trial, or if the witness is 
unavailable, the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.”25
(3) Crawford offered three possible definitions for “testimonial” 
statements: (i) “‘ex parte in-court testimony or its functional 
equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, 
prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or 
similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be 
used prosecutorially;” (ii) “‘extrajudicial statements . . . contained in 
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior 
testimony, or confessions;’” and (iii) “‘statements that were made under 
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to 
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.’”
 
26
 
 20. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2533.   
 
 21. See id. at 2543 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and 
Alito joined Justice Kennedy’s dissent.  Id.  
 22. See id. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 23. See id. at 2531 (majority opinion) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI). 
 24. See id. 
 25. See id.  
 26. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004)) (omissions in original). 
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(4) The certificates at issue in Melendez-Diaz, having been sworn to 
before a notary public, “[we]re quite plainly affidavits,” placing them 
squarely within formulations (i) and (ii).27  They also fit within 
formulation (iii), for “under Massachusetts law the[ir] sole purpose . . . 
was to provide ‘prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the 
net weight of the analyzed substance.’”28
(5) Accordingly, the certificates were testimonial statements, and 
their analyst authors were “‘witnesses for purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment.’”
 
29  Absent a showing by the prosecution of unavailability 
and a prior opportunity for cross-examination, Melendez-Diaz was 
entitled to confront them at trial.30
For the dissent, the Court’s error begins at Step (2).  In the 
dissenters’ view, the term “witness” in the Confrontation Clause 
embraces only “conventional” witnesses—those who perceive events 
giving them “personal knowledge of some aspect of the defendant’s 
guilt.”
 
31  But unlike a conventional witness, a technician or analyst 
“observes neither the crime nor any human action related to it.”32  
Whereas a conventional witness recalls past events, an analyst’s report 
consists of “near-contemporaneous observations.”33  And while analysts 
conduct “laboratory tests . . . according to scientific protocols,” a 
conventional witness “responds to questions under interrogation.”34
This dichotomy is not without flaws.  Limiting confrontation to 
those witnesses with first-hand knowledge of the crime would yield 
 
 
 27. See id. at 2532. 
 28. Id. (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 111, § 13). 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. 
 31. See id. at 2551 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  The dissent assumes that thus defined, this class 
excludes forensic analysts.  But the chemists who analyzed the seized substances in Melendez-Diaz 
presumably perceived their own execution of the tests as well as those tests’ results, and on 
perceiving those results, they acquired personal knowledge that the substances contained cocaine—
a fact material to Melendez-Diaz’s guilt of trafficking cocaine. 
 32. Id. at 2552. 
 33. Id. at 2551.  The Court’s holding in Davis v. Washington does incorporate this 
consideration, see id., but does not turn on it.  Davis held that statements made under police 
interrogation are non-testimonial when circumstances objectively indicate that the interrogation’s 
primary purpose is to enable police to meet an ongoing emergency, and testimonial when 
circumstances indicate that the interrogation’s primary purpose is to prove past facts potentially 
relevant to later criminal prosecution.  Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).  The 
distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial statements thus depends on the statements’ 
primary purpose, not on their timing.  See id. at 826-28.  Whether a statement narrates ongoing 
events or reports completed acts is simply one factor that may “objectively indicate [that] its 
primary purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency,” or alternatively, 
that its primary purpose was to report or provide evidence of a crime.  Id. at 828. 
 34. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2552 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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absurd results, allowing unconfronted admission of police reports and 
exempting expert witnesses.35  Further, if near-contemporaneous 
observations were exempt from confrontation, then victims’ crime-scene 
affidavits and accusations to interrogating officers would be non-
testimonial, and Hammon v. Indiana, decided in 2006 by an eight-
member majority, would have come out the other way.36  As for the 
suggestion that the Confrontation Clause reaches only responses to 
interrogation, “‘[t]he Framers were no more willing to exempt from 
cross-examination volunteered testimony . . . than they were to exempt 
answers to detailed questions.’”37
Nevertheless, two arguments the dissent marshals for its competing 
constitutional theory merit further examination because they illuminate 
the depth of the Court’s internal dispute—and the direction in which its 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence may be headed.  First, the dissent 
turns to the historical record, arguing that the Framers intended the 
Clause to apply only to “conventional” witnesses.  Second, it contends 
that the majority has misconstrued the Court’s holding in Crawford, and 
that Crawford in fact agrees with its own reading of the Confrontation 
Clause.  The next two sections analyze the majority and dissenting 
opinions’ arguments and counter-arguments on these two points.
 
38
 
 35. Id. at 2535 (majority opinion). 
 
 36. See id.  Hammon was consolidated with Davis, as both cases involved Crawford’s 
application to statements made in the course of police interrogation.  In Hammon, police responded 
to a reported domestic dispute at the Hammons’ home, and when Amy Hammon invited them to 
enter, they saw evidence of a very recent physical altercation.  Davis, 547 U.S. at 819.  Once they 
had separated the couple for questioning, Amy accused her husband of battery, and at the 
interviewing officer’s request, she signed an affidavit.  Id. at 819-20.  Amy’s accusation and her 
affidavit were made sufficiently close in time to the events she described that in her husband’s 
subsequent battery trial, the court admitted her statements to the officer under the hearsay exception 
for excited utterances, and her affidavit under the hearsay exception for present sense impressions.  
See id. at 820; IND. R. EVID. 803(1) (defining “present sense impression” as “[a] statement 
describing or explaining a material event, condition, or transaction, made while the declarant was 
perceiving the event, condition, or transaction, or immediately thereafter”); IND. R. EVID. 803(2) 
(defining “excited utterance” as “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while 
the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition”).  Nonetheless, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that Amy’s statements and affidavit “could not be admitted absent an 
opportunity to confront the witness.”  Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2535.  Even setting aside this 
conflict with precedent, the dissent’s distinction between “near-contemporaneous observations” and 
recollection of past events would not change the outcome in Melendez-Diaz.  The certificates of 
analysis challenged there, having been “completed almost a week after the tests were performed,” 
could hardly be characterized as setting forth “near-contemporaneous observations.”  Id. 
 37. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2535 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822-23 n.1) (alteration in 
original).  In any event, the certificates in Melendez-Diaz were produced at police request.  Id. 
 38. The dissent also offers a third argument:  that by “expand[ing] the Clause to include 
laboratory analysts,” id. at 2551 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), the Court had “swe[pt] away an accepted 
rule governing the admission of scientific evidence” that “ha[d] been established for at least 90 
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B. History Lessons 
The dissent claims that when drafting the Confrontation Clause, 
“[t]he Framers were concerned with a typical witness—one who 
perceived an event that gave rise to a personal belief in some aspect of 
the defendant’s guilt”—not with “an analyst who conducts a scientific 
test far removed from the crime.”39  To support this claim, the dissent 
cites the established framing-era practice of admitting copyists’ 
affidavits without confrontation.40  Then, as now, prosecutors often 
relied on official records to prove elements of an offense, and as today, 
original records could not always be brought to court.41  Modernly, 
photocopiers and certifications from records custodians have resolved 
this dilemma, but at the Framers’ time, copyists reproduced the records 
by hand.  Because a trial could turn on a copyist’s “honesty and 
diligence,” the copyist would also “prepare[] an affidavit certifying that 
the copy [was] true and accurate.”42  Although the copies and 
accompanying affidavits had “been made for the purpose of introducing 
the copies into evidence at trial,” early American courts routinely 
admitted them in criminal cases.43
Under the Melendez-Diaz Court’s holding, copyists would have to 
provide live testimony:  their affidavits are “formal out-of-court 
statement[s] offered for the truth of two matters (the copyist’s honesty 
and the copy’s accuracy), and . . . prepared for a criminal prosecution.”
 
44  
Indeed, the dissent argues, “one possible reading of the Court’s opinion” 
likewise demands confrontation of modern records custodians, whose 
unconfronted certifications of accuracy have long sufficed to 
authenticate public and business records.45
 
years” and that had “extend[ed] across at least 35 States and six Federal Courts of Appeals,” id. at 
2543; see also id. at 2558-61 (cataloging hundreds of decisions as evidence for this proposition).  In 
a sense, this argument comes too late.  Most of the cases the dissent cites in support of its claim rely 
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Roberts, on “its since-rejected theory that unconfronted 
testimony was admissible as long as it bore indicia of reliability,” or on state law.  See id. at 2533 
(majority opinion).  To the extent the Court has upended established practice with respect to the 
admission of scientific evidence, the crucial rupture occurred six years ago, with Crawford.  Unless 
either the majority has misread Crawford or that case was wrongly decided, the dissent’s catalog of 
precedent is beside the point.  
 
 39. Id. at 2551 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 40. Id.   
 41. See id. at 2553 (citing bigamy, for which marriage records were required, as an example). 
 42. See id. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 2546-47. 
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In response, the majority contends that a copyist’s authority was 
limited:  he could “‘certify to the correctness of a copy of a record kept 
in his office,’ but had ‘no authority to furnish, as evidence for the trial of 
a lawsuit, his interpretation of what the record contains or shows, or to 
certify to its substance or effect.’”46  In the majority’s view, that this 
lone historical exception to its reading of the Confrontation Clause was 
“narrowly circumscribed” “vindicates the general rule.”47  Copyists 
could authenticate evidence, but they could not create it, as the analysts 
in Melendez-Diaz had done.48
Intuitively, the distinction between an affidavit offered to prove a 
defendant’s guilt, and an affidavit offered to prove that some other piece 
of evidence is what it purports to be, seems right.  Yet, both are created 
solely to be introduced at trial, and both are offered for their truth, 
placing them squarely within the Court’s definition of testimonial 
hearsay.  As a logical matter, it is unclear precisely why copyists’ and 
authenticating witnesses’ “narrowly circumscribed” authority should 
exempt them from confrontation.
  
49  One could argue that the authority of 
a pure character witness—one who testifies to a percipient witness’s 
character for truthfulness but otherwise lacks personal knowledge of 
facts relevant to the case—is equally circumscribed.  He may attest to 
the fact witness’s general veracity but not the substance of the witness’s 
testimony.  Does the Confrontation Clause therefore permit prosecutors 
to bolster witnesses’ credibility with affidavits?  Moreover, as the 
dissent asks, why should “laboratory analysts’ authority . . . not also be 
deemed ‘narrowly circumscribed’ so that they, too, may be excused from 
testifying”?50
The majority could have more effectively deflated the dissent’s 
argument by simply acknowledging the apparent existence of a historical 
exception to Crawford without attempting to rationalize it.  The Court 
did as much in Crawford itself with the traditional exception for 
testimonial dying declarations.
 
51
 
 46. Id. at 2539 (majority opinion) (quoting State v. Wilson, 75 So. 95, 97 (La. 1917)). 
  The existence of a single class of 
 47. See id.  
 48. See id.  
 49. See id. at 2553 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  Indeed, “[d]etermining whether a witness’ 
authority is ‘narrowly circumscribed’ has nothing to do with Crawford’s testimonial framework.”  
Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004) (observing that, “[a]lthough 
many dying declarations may not be testimonial, there is authority for admitting even those that 
clearly are,” and concluding that “[i]f this exception must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui 
generis”). 
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“unconventional” witnesses whose unconfronted testimonial statements 
were traditionally admissible neither proves the existence of other such 
classes nor vitiates the general rule.52  And copyists’ certificates aside, 
early American courts did require confrontation for other types of 
“unconventional” witnesses.53  Although courts routinely admitted 
copyists’ affidavits to authenticate official records, a clerk’s “certificate 
attesting to the fact that the clerk had searched for a particular relevant 
record and failed to find it,” did not receive the same treatment.54  Such 
affidavits—like those of the laboratory analysts in Melendez-Diaz—
“would serve as substantive evidence against the defendant whose guilt 
depended on the nonexistence of the record for which the clerk 
searched.”55  Accordingly, their authors were subject to confrontation.56
 
 52. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2538. 
  
Three nineteenth-century cases suggest that the same rule applied to 
forensic analysts of that era:  “[i]n all three cases, defendants—who were 
prosecuted for selling adulterated milk—objected to the admission of the 
state chemists’ certificates of analysis,” and in all three cases, the court 
overruled their objections after the prosecution “came forward with live 
 53. See id. at 2539 & n.9. 
 54. Id. at 2539.  Today, these documents are known as CNRs, short for certificate of 
nonexistence of record, or of no record.  See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Rios, 595 F.3d 581, 
583 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Burgos, 539 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2008); Tabaka v. District 
of Columbia, 976 A.2d 173, 175 (D.C. 2009).  Four days after issuing its decision in Melendez-
Diaz, the Court issued a GVR order—granting certiorari, vacating the decision below, and 
remanding for reconsideration in light of Melendez-Diaz—in a case in which the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals had concluded that a CNR was non-testimonial.  See United States v. Norwood, 
555 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 491 (2009).  
The Court typically issues GVR orders  
[w]here intervening developments, or recent developments that we have reason to 
believe the court below did not fully consider, reveal a reasonable probability that the 
decision below rests upon a premise that the lower court would reject if given the 
opportunity for further consideration, and where it appears that such a redetermination 
may determine the ultimate outcome of the litigation . . . .  
Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 167 (1996) (emphasis added).  The Norwood GVR order 
strongly hinted that CNRs are testimonial under Melendez-Diaz, and since then, lower courts have 
consistently reached that conclusion.  See, e.g., Martinez-Rios, 595 F.3d at 585-86; Tabaka, 976 
A.2d at 175; Washington v. State, 18 So. 3d 1221, 1223-25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).  Cf. United 
States v. Norwood, 603 F.3d 1063, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2010) (as amended on denial of rehearing en 
banc) (government conceded that CNR’s author should have been made available to testify, but 
court held that any error was harmless); United States v. Madarikan, 356 F. App’x 532, 534 (2d Cir. 
2009) (same). 
 55. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2539. 
 56. Id. 
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witnesses.”57  While not definitive, these cases raise “doubt as to the 
admissibility of the certificates without opportunity for cross-
examination.”58
Thus, the historical record does not support the dissent’s theory.  At 
the time of the framing, its binary scheme of “conventional” and 
“unconventional” witnesses did not govern whether confrontation was 
required.  But, history does not unequivocally support the majority’s 
holding, either.  In Crawford, the Court relied principally on “the 
historical background of the [Confrontation] Clause to understand its 
meaning,” and it examined numerous early cases to ascertain how the 
Framers would have understood the common-law right before 
concluding that the Clause applies to testimonial statements.
 
59
C. Crawford’s Holding 
  In 
Melendez-Diaz, the dissent identifies a second category of hearsay 
statements (in addition to dying declarations) that, though testimonial, 
were routinely admissible absent confrontation in the Framers’ era.  
These exceptions may not invalidate the rule, but they do give rise to a 
colorable argument that the rule is overbroad.  The Melendez-Diaz 
dissent could have pointed to mounting evidence that the Crawford 
Court misread its history to reach an erroneously expansive holding.  
Rather than launch a frontal assault on Crawford, however, the dissent 
opts for intellectual subterfuge, arguing that Crawford did not hold what 
the majority claims it did. 
The dissent disputes the majority’s reading of Crawford and of 
Davis v. Washington, in which the Court addressed Crawford’s 
application to statements made under police interrogation.60  The dissent 
contends that in interpreting the Confrontation Clause, Crawford and 
Davis used the adjective “‘testimonial’” only to “avoid the awkward 
phrasing required by reusing the noun ‘witness.’”61  By reading 
Crawford to hold “that anyone who makes a testimonial statement is a 
witness for purposes of the Confrontation Clause,”62
 
 57. Id. at 2539 n.9 (citing Commonwealth v. Waite, 93 Mass. 264, 266 (1865)); see also 
Shivers v. Newton, 45 N.J.L. 469, 476 (Sup. Ct. 1883); State v. Campbell, 13 A. 585, 586 (N.H. 
1888)). 
 the majority had 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-56 (2004). 
 60. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2543 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 61. Id. at 2552. 
 62. Id. at 2543. 
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“transform[ed] that turn of phrase into a new and sweeping legal rule.”63  
Crawford and Davis may have “suggested that any testimonial 
statement, by any person, no matter how distant from the defendant and 
the crime, is subject to” confrontation,64 but “th[is] suggestion was not 
part of the holding of Crawford or Davis.”65  Rather, these cases’ 
holdings extend no further than their facts, and in both, the hearsay 
declarants whose statements lie at issue—“women who had seen, and in 
two cases been the victim of, the crime in question”—were conventional 
witnesses.66
The Melendez-Diaz majority does not meet this argument directly, 
evidently trusting to the unambiguous prose in Crawford and Davis to 
settle the question in its favor.  Indeed, although the words “we hold” do 
not appear in Crawford, the opinion clearly telegraphs its purpose:  
rather than select or extrapolate from an existing rule to resolve the facts 
before it, the Court intends to deduce a new rule through application of 
first principles.
  In short, the Court’s discussion of “testimonial” statements 
was just dicta. 
67  After examining the constitutional text and the 
historical record, the Court hazards two conclusions: (1) “even if the 
Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned with testimonial hearsay, that 
is its primary object”; and (2) “the Framers would not have allowed 
admission of testimonial [hearsay] of a witness who did not appear at 
trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a 
prior opportunity for cross-examination.”68  Thus construed, the Clause 
applied to the hearsay statements Crawford challenged, and because he 
had had no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, their admission 
over his objection was error.69
The Crawford Court “readily concede[d]” that applying the until-
then-prevailing Roberts test would not have changed the outcome.
 
70
 
 63. Id. at 2552. 
  
But, it explained, Crawford was “one of those rare cases” that “reveals a 
fundamental failure on our part to interpret the Constitution in a way that 
secures its intended constraint on judicial discretion,” and that thus 
compels a plenary reinterpretation of the constitutional provision 
 64. Id. (emphasis added). 
 65. Id. (emphasis added). 
 66. Id. at 2543. 
 67. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-47 (2004) (turning to constitutional text and 
“historical background of the [Confrontation] Clause” to resolve the case). 
 68. See id. at 53-54; accord id. at 59. 
 69. See id. at 61, 68. 
 70. Id. at 67. 
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concerned.71  In the final paragraphs of its opinion, the Court 
summarized the results of this process:  “Where testimonial evidence is 
at issue . . . the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law 
required:  unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.”72
If the absence of the words “we hold” from this sentence creates 
ambiguity as to its import, Davis eliminates all room for doubt.  Davis 
required the Court to determine whether and under what circumstances 
the Confrontation Clause applies to hearsay statements made during 
police interrogation.
 
73
we held that [the Confrontation Clause] bars “admission of testimonial 
statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was 
unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity 
for cross-examination.”  A critical portion of this holding, and the 
portion central to resolution of the two cases now before us, is the 
phrase “testimonial statements.”  Only statements of this sort cause the 
declarant to be a ‘witness’ within the meaning of the Confrontation 
Clause.
  In setting forth the governing law, the Court 
states that in Crawford,  
 74
Davis thus makes clear that Crawford held precisely what the 
Melendez-Diaz dissent insists it did not:  that “anyone who makes a 
testimonial statement is a witness for purposes of the Confrontation 
Clause.”
 
75
Lower courts have certainly understood Crawford’s holding in this 
way.
 
76
 
 71. See id.  
  True, before Melendez-Diaz, lower courts had split as to whether 
 72. Id. at 68. 
 73. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 817 (2006) (framing the issue as “when 
statements made to law enforcement personnel during a 911 call or at a crime scene are 
‘testimonial’ and thus subject to the requirements of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation 
Clause”). 
 74. Id. at 821 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 75. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
Davis’s reading of Crawford produced little controversy at the time.  Eight members of the Court—
including all four Melendez-Diaz dissenters—joined the Davis majority.  Compare Melendez-Diaz, 
129 S. Ct. at 2543 (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and Alito joined Justice Kennedy’s 
dissent), with Davis, 547 U.S. at 815 (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito joined Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court). Indeed, two Melendez-
Diaz dissenters—Justices Kennedy and Breyer—formed part of the seven-justice majority 
responsible for Crawford.  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 37 (Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, 
Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court). 
 76. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 472 F.3d 910, 914 (D.C. Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 290 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Tolliver, 454 F.3d 660, 664-65 (7th Cir. 
2006); People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 133-34 (Cal. 2007); State v. Lopez, 974 So.2d 340, 345-46 
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forensic analysts’ certificates and reports were admissible under 
Crawford.77  But their decisions consistently turned on whether the 
challenged documents were testimonial, not on whether their authors 
were conventional witnesses.  Some courts deemed forensic reports non-
testimonial because the assertions they contained were not overtly 
accusatory.78
 
(Fla. 2008); People v. Taylor, 759 N.W.2d 361, 377 (Mich. 2008); Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 
734-35 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 
  Other courts relied on a dictum in Crawford.  Observing 
 77. Compare United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2007) (raw data generated 
by chromatograph non-testimonial); United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920 (7th Cir. 2006) (blood test 
result non-testimonial); Pruitt v. Alabama, 954 So.2d 611 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (compound 
analysis report non-testimonial); Geier, 161 P.3d 104 (DNA test result non-testimonial); People v. 
Leach, 908 N.E.2d 120, 174 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (autopsy report non-testimonial); State v. Lackey, 
120 P.3d 332 (Kan. 2005) (same); State v. Anderson, 942 So.2d 625 (La. Ct. App.  2006); 
Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701 (Mass. 2005) (compound analysis report non-
testimonial); State v. O’Maley, 932 A.2d 1 (N.H. 2007) (blood alcohol analysis result non-
testimonial); State v. Forte, 629 S.E.2d 137 (N.C. 2006) (serology report non-testimonial); State v. 
Dedman, 102 P.3d 628 (N.M. 2004) (blood alcohol analysis result non-testimonial); People v. 
Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 2008) (raw data generated by private DNA lab non-testimonial); 
State v. Crager, 879 N.E.2d 745 (Ohio 2007) (same); Campos v. State, 256 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. App. 
2008) (autopsy report and DNA report containing only raw data non-testimonial), with State v. 
Moss, 160 P.3d 1143 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (blood analysis report testimonial); Hinojos-Mendoza v. 
People, 169 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2007) (lab report testimonial); Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1 
(D.C. 2006) (same); State v. Johnson, 982 So.2d 672 (Fla. 2008) (compound analysis report 
testimonial); Jackson v. State, 891 N.E.2d 657 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Laturner, 163 P.3d 367 
(Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (lab report testimonial); People v. Lonsby, 707 N.W.2d 610 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2005) (same); State v. Caufield, 722 N.W.2d 304 (Minn. 2006) (same); State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 
663 (Mo. 2007) (same); City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 124 P.3d 203 (Nev. 2005) (affidavit from 
nurse who drew blood for alcohol analysis testimonial); State v. Kent, 918 A.2d 626 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2007) (state crime lab report and blood-draw certificate both testimonial); Rawlins, 884 
N.E.2d 1019 (latent fingerprint analysis reports testimonial); State v. Smith, No. 1-05-39, 2006 WL 
846342 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2006) (compound analysis report testimonial); State v. Birchfield, 
157 P.3d 216 (Or. 2007) (same); Acevedo v. State, 255 S.W.3d 162 (Tex. App. 2008) (fingerprint 
comparison report testimonial).  Cf. Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821, 853 (Md. 2006) (holding that 
factual observations in autopsy report are non-testimonial, but that contested conclusions and 
opinions “central to the determination of corpus delicti or criminal agency” are testimonial). 
 78. See, e.g., Lackey, 120 P.3d at 351-52 (concluding that “factual, routine, descriptive, and 
nonanalytical findings made in an autopsy report are nontestimonial”); Forte, 629 S.E.2d at 143 
(admitting unsworn serology report as non-testimonial because it was “neutral” and contained 
“objective” analysis “having the power to exonerate as well as convict”); Dedman, 102 P.3d at 636 
(finding blood alcohol analysis report non-testimonial because it was “routine, non-adversarial, and 
made to ensure an accurate measurement”). 
  The State tried this argument in Melendez-Diaz, but the Court rejected it for two reasons.  
See 129 S. Ct. at 2533-34. First, the Sixth Amendment “contemplates two classes of witnesses—
those against the defendant,” whom the Confrontation Clause obliges the prosecution to produce, 
“and those in his favor,” whom the Compulsory Process Clause entitles him to subpoena.  Id. at 
2534.  “[T]here is not a third category of witnesses, helpful to the prosecution, but somehow 
immune from confrontation.”  Id.  Second, “[i]t is often, indeed perhaps usually, the case that an 
adverse witness’s testimony,” though crucial to the prosecution’s case, is not accusatory on its face, 
but courts have never exempted such witnesses from confrontation.  See id. 
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that most traditional “hearsay exceptions covered statements that by 
their nature were not testimonial,” the Crawford Court cited business 
records as an example,79 and many lower courts either gave this 
statement substantial weight or read it as a bright-line rule.80  After 
Davis, some lower courts admitting analysts’ certificates and reports 
absent confrontation did rely, in part, on the fact that the records had 
been created near-contemporaneously with the observations and 
conclusions they recited.81  Yet these courts reasoned that this 
characteristic rendered the reports non-testimonial—not that it marked 
their authors as “unconventional” witnesses outside the Confrontation 
Clause. 82
The dissent turns up little evidence in Crawford or in the historical 
record to support its constitutional theory, but that theory, and the 
dissent’s efforts to defend it, are meaningful, nevertheless.  The dissent’s 
theory failed to carry the day in Melendez-Diaz, but it represents how 
four members of the Court view the Confrontation Clause.  And in light 
of Justice Thomas’s continued adherence to an independent reading of 
the Clause, it marks a three-way split in the Court’s jurisprudence.  In 
the next two sections, I examine Justice Thomas’s view of the Clause 
and explore the implications of this three-way doctrinal division. 
  Indeed, prior to Melendez-Diaz, no court had read Crawford 
as applying the Clause only to “conventional” witnesses. 
 
 79. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56. 
 80. See, e.g., Ellis, 460 F.3d at 921, 924-26 (concluding that medical records describing 
results of blood and urine tests conducted by hospital at police request, while defendant was in 
police custody, were non-testimonial because “[t]here is no indication that the observations 
embodied in [the] records were made in anything but the ordinary course of business”); State v. 
Craig, 853 N.E.2d 621, 638-39 (Ohio 2006) (agreeing with “the majority view under Crawford . . . 
that autopsy records are admissible as business records”); Verde, 827 N.E.2d at 705-06 (admitting 
drug analysis certificate because “it was akin to a business record, which the Court stated was not 
testimonial in nature”). 
  In Melendez-Diaz, the Court clarified that while “[d]ocuments kept in the regular course 
of business may ordinarily be admitted at trial despite their hearsay status . . . that is not the case if 
the regularly conducted business activity is the production of evidence for use at trial.”  129 S. Ct. at 
2538 (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(6)).  The same limitation applies to the hearsay exception for public 
records.  See id.  Thus, records generated for use in litigation do not meet these exceptions, and 
when the contemplated litigation is a criminal prosecution, the constitution further constrains their 
admission.  See id. (citing Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943), and FED. R. EVID. 803(8)). 
 81. See, e.g., Geier, 161 P.3d at 139-40; O’Maley, 932 A.2d at 12; Crager, 879 N.E.2d at 
756-57. 
 82. See supra note 81. 
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D. Independent Voter 
Justice Thomas first articulated his theory of the Confrontation 
Clause in White v. Illinois.83  Though written many years earlier, his 
concurring opinion in that case foreshadows Crawford by questioning 
the Court’s increasing conflation of the constitutional right to 
confrontation with hearsay law, and by proposing that the Court 
reconsider its understanding of that right in light of the historical 
record.84  As “one possible formulation” of the right, Justice Thomas 
offered the following:  “The federal constitutional right of confrontation 
extends to any witness who actually testifies at trial, but the 
Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial statements only 
insofar as they are contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as 
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.”85  In Crawford, 
the Court quoted this proposal and two others as possible “formulations 
of th[e] core class of ‘testimonial’ statements.”86  The hearsay statement 
challenged in Crawford—a confession given during custodial 
interrogation—fell squarely within the category Justice Thomas defined 
in White, and he joined the Court’s opinion in Crawford without writing 
separately.87
In Hammon, however, his was the lone voice of dissent.
 
88  In Davis, 
the Court held that a woman’s statements to a 911 operator, made while 
the defendant was attacking her, were non-testimonial because the 
interrogation’s primary purpose was to resolve an ongoing emergency.89  
But in Hammon, the companion case, the Court held that an assault 
victim’s statements to police after the officers had secured the scene 
were testimonial because their primary purpose was to provide evidence 
against her assailant.90  For Justice Thomas, neither woman’s statements 
were testimonial as that term should be defined.91  In his view, the 
Confrontation Clause’s history makes clear that testimony involves 
“some degree of solemnity.”92
 
 83. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 358 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
  Thus, “[a]ffidavits, depositions, and prior 
 84. See id. at 358-66. 
 85. Id. at 365. 
 86. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004). 
 87. See id. at 38-40. 
 88. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 834 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 89. See id. at 828 (majority opinion). 
 90. See id. at 830. 
 91. Id. at 840 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 92. Id. at 836. 
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testimony”—statements that “are, by their very nature, taken through a 
formalized process”—are testimonial, as are “confessions . . . extracted 
by police in a formal manner,” such as during custodial interrogation.93  
Otherwise, unless offered by the prosecution “to evade confrontation,” 
statements in response to police interrogation that lack “indicia of 
formality” do not trigger the constitutional right to confrontation.94
In Melendez-Diaz, Justice Thomas joined the majority but wrote 
separately, explaining that he had done so only because the certificates 
of analysis were “‘quite plainly affidavits.’”
 
95  He has thus held 
steadfastly to an independent—and thoroughly originalist—view of the 
Confrontation Clause.96
 
 93. Id. at 836-37. 
  When, in his opinion, the Court has drifted too 
far from the Clause’s original meaning, he has taken it to task.  In Davis, 
he criticized the primary purpose test as “disconnected from history and 
unnecessary to prevent abuse” because, under certain circumstances, it 
 94. See id. at 840.  Justice Thomas allowed that the Confrontation Clause forbids the 
admission of even informal out-of-court statements in response to interrogation if the prosecution 
attempts to use them “as a means of circumventing the literal right of confrontation,” but he did not 
explain what he would view as an attempt at circumvention.  See id. at 838.  Later in the opinion, 
however, he observes that in neither Davis nor Hammon did the prosecution “offer the women’s 
hearsay evidence at trial to evade confrontation,” and in supporting citations, he notes that in each 
case, the state endeavored to secure the declarant’s appearance at trial.  Id. at 840.  The witness in 
Hammon ignored a subpoena, and the state could not locate the witness in Davis at the time of trial.  
Id.  These citations suggest that in Justice Thomas’ view, an informal out-of-court statement only 
implicates the Confrontation Clause when the declarant is otherwise available to testify at trial.  Or 
conversely, the Clause requires unavailability, but not a prior opportunity for cross-examination, for 
statements that would be testimonial but for their informality. 
 95. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 96. In Giles v. California, where the testimonial quality of the victim-declarant’s statement 
was not at issue, Justice Thomas concurred separately to note his continued adherence to his 
previously-expressed views—under which the victim’s statement to a police officer during an 
informal dialogue would not be testimonial.  128 S. Ct. at 2678, 2693-94 (2008) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
  Curiously, Justice Alito also concurred separately in Giles to express doubt as to whether 
the victim—who spoke to the officer three weeks before her death, and who, crying as she spoke, 
related how the defendant had beaten, choked, and threatened her, id. at 2680-81 —was a “witness” 
within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.  Id. at 2694 (Alito, J., concurring).  The basis for 
these doubts is unclear.  As one who had perceived an event that gave her personal knowledge of 
some aspect of the defendant’s guilt, the victim in Giles was undoubtedly a “conventional” witness 
as defined by the dissenting opinion Justice Alito joined in Melendez-Diaz.  See Melendez-Diaz, 129 
S. Ct. at 2551 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  And the factual circumstances surrounding her statement 
closely resembled those in Hammon, where Justice Alito joined the majority in holding that the 
victim-declarant’s statements were testimonial.  Compare Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2680-81, and People 
v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 846 (Ct. App. 2004) (depublished when California Supreme Court 
granted review), with Davis, 547 U.S. at 819-20. 
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captured responses to informal police questioning.97  The Davis majority 
reasoned that in the modern era, “[i]t imports sufficient formality . . . 
that lies to [examining police] officers are criminal offenses.”98
. . . may render honesty in casual conversations with police officers 
important[, but] [i]t does not . . . render those conversations solemn or 
formal in the ordinary meanings of those terms.”
  For 
Justice Thomas, however, “[t]he possibility that an oral declaration of 
past fact to a police officer, if false, could result in legal consequences  
99  He also disparaged 
the test’s unpredictable results.100  In White, he had warned that 
“[a]ttempts to draw a line between statements made in contemplation of 
legal proceedings and those not so made would entangle the courts in a 
multitude of difficulties.”101  Yet the Davis Court had drawn just such a 
line by making the testimonial character of responses to police 
interrogation dependent on the interrogation’s primary purpose.102  
Because police officers who respond to a reported crime generally have 
multiple motives for interrogating a witness, accurately identifying their 
subjective, primary purpose would be impossible.103  An objective test 
aimed at “the function served by the interrogation” would be little better, 
as it would “shift the ability to control whether a violation occurred from 
the police and prosecutor to the judge,” whose hindsight purpose 
assessment “would be unpredictable and not necessarily tethered to the 
actual purpose for which the police performed the interrogation.”104
 
 97. Davis, 547 U.S. at 838 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 
 98. Id. at 830 n.5 (majority opinion). 
 99. Id. at 838 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 100. Id. at 838. 
 101. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 364 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment). 
 102. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 838-40 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part).  
 103. Id. at 839. 
 104. Id. at 839-40.  Justice Thomas did not address a third plausible reading of the primary 
purpose test—that purpose should be evaluated from an objective declarant’s point of view.  Two of 
the three formulations of “testimonial statements” quoted in Crawford incorporate an objective 
declarant standard: “‘ex-parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent  . . . [including] similar 
pre-trial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially,’” Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 51 (quoting Brief for Petitioner 23); and “‘statements that were made under 
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would 
be available for use at a later trial,” id. at 52 (quoting Brief for National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae 3).  And in Davis, the Court emphasized, albeit in a 
footnote, that whether made under interrogation or otherwise, “it is in the final analysis the 
declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to 
evaluate.”  547 U.S. at 822 n.1.  Commentators have split as to whether the Davis test incorporates 
the interrogator’s perspective or that of a reasonable declarant, but most have acknowledged that the 
STEVENS_CONLAW_2010-2011.DOC 6/2/2011  1:50 PM 
2011] CRAWFORD’S LAST STAND? 99 
Despite the misgivings Justice Thomas expressed in Davis, purpose 
plays a continued role in Melendez-Diaz, demonstrating that it remains 
an important factor for the majority’s other four members.  In holding 
that the certificates of analysis were testimonial, the Court emphasized 
that “under Massachusetts law the[ir] sole purpose . . . was to provide 
‘prima facie evidence’” in a criminal trial.105  In contrast, “medical 
reports created for treatment purposes” and traditional business 
records—those created in the regular course of a business activity 
unrelated to the production of evidence or the prosecution of crimes—
were inherently non-testimonial.106  The Court added that “documents 
prepared in the regular course of equipment maintenance may well 
qualify as nontestimonial records.”107  Yet this class of records illustrates 
the problematic malleability of a purpose-focused test that Justice 
Thomas foresaw in White and disparaged in Davis.  Consider, for 
example, calibration and maintenance records for a breathalyzer 
machine owned and operated by a law enforcement agency.  Because 
purpose can be considered at varying levels of abstraction, courts have 
split as to whether such records are testimonial under Melendez-Diaz.108  
Some courts have reasoned that they are created for routine, 
administrative purposes and not for any particular prosecution, and are 
accordingly non-testimonial.109  But others have found that police 
departments maintain and calibrate breathalyzer machines only to 
facilitate their production of admissible evidence, so the resulting 
records are testimonial.110
 
opinion admits of the latter reading.  See, e.g, Friedman, supra note 1, at 560-62 (describing 
ambiguity in the Davis opinion, contending that “the declarant’s perspective is the better one,” and 
suggesting that the Court may have referenced the interrogator’s purpose because it would logically 
influence a reasonable declarant’s perceptions in the context of interrogation); Michael S. Pardo, 
Testimony, 82 TUL. L. REV. 119, 172-74 (2007) (contending that Davis leaves open four 
possibilities for “when a statement becomes testimonial for confrontation purposes”—when it is 
testimonial from the interrogator’s perspective, the declarant’s perspective, either, or both—and 
advocating an either/or standard); Gregory M. O’Neil, Comment, Davis & Hammon:  Redefining 
the Constitutional Right to Confrontation, 40 CONN. L. REV. 511, 544-47 & n.221 (2007) 
(discussing varying interpretations of whose perspective governs, and advocating a declarant-
focused test). 
 
 105. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009) (quoting MASS. GEN. 
LAWS, ch. 111, § 13). 
 106. Id. at 2533 n.2, 2538. 
 107. Id. at 2532 n.1. 
 108. See infra notes 171-179 and accompanying text. 
 109. See, e.g., United States v. Forstell, 656 F. Supp. 2d 578, 580-81 (E.D. Va. 2009); State v. 
Bergin, 217 P.3d 1087, 1088-90 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).  
 110. See, e.g., People v. Carreira, 893 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846-47 (City Ct. 2010); People v. 
Heyanka, 886 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (Dist. Ct. 2009).  
STEVENS_CONLAW_2010-2011.DOC 6/2/2011  1:50 PM 
100 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLICY [2:81 
In most cases, however, lower courts need not entangle themselves 
in such purpose assessments.  Because Justice Thomas provided the 
decisive fifth vote in Melendez-Diaz, as the “position taken by th[e] 
Member[] who concurred in the judgment[] on the narrowest grounds,” 
his opinion reflects “the holding of the Court.”111  That opinion refers to 
two classes of extrajudicial statements that, in Justice Thomas’s view, 
qualify as testimonial: (1) those “‘contained in formalized testimonial 
materials’”;112 and (2) those that are “‘sufficiently formal to resemble’” 
the seventeenth-century ex parte witness examinations that prompted the 
Framers to constitutionalize the common-law confrontation right.113
 
 111. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976); accord Marks v. United States, 430 
U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
  
Thus, Melendez-Diaz applies to affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, 
confessions, Mirandized or custodial interrogations—and perhaps not 
much else. 
  Few lower courts applying Melendez-Diaz have read its holding as limited to “formalized 
testimonial materials,” and those courts treating Justice Thomas’s concurrence as procedurally 
determinative have diverged in its substantive application.  The New Mexico Supreme Court 
acknowledged that Justice Thomas’s concurrence defines the bounds of Melendez-Diaz, but it 
construed the class of “formalized testimonial materials” as including unsworn reports of drug and 
blood-alcohol analyses.  See State v. Aragon, 225 P.3d 1280, 1284-85 (N.M. 2010) (compound 
analysis reports); State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1, 8 (N.M. 2010) (results of gas chromatograph 
analysis of defendant’s blood alcohol content).  In contrast, at least one California court has 
declined to apply Melendez-Diaz to unsworn forensic and laboratory reports, which do not 
obviously constitute “formalized testimonial materials,” or to the in-court recitation of their contents 
by a live witness.  See People v. Vargas, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 578, 587 (Ct. App. 2009) (concluding 
that, “because of the limited nature of Justice Thomas’ concurrence, the precedential value of the 
majority’s analysis” equating “conventional” witnesses who testify to past events, and “analysts” 
who make near-contemporaneous observations, “is unclear as applied to a laboratory analyst’s 
report or a similar forensic report”).  Distinguishing Melendez-Diaz, Vargas instead followed the 
California Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in People v. Geier.  Geier held that a DNA analyst’s 
report and notes—about which another expert gave in-court testimony—were non-testimonial in 
part because they documented the analyst’s contemporaneous observations.  See 161 P.3d 104, 138-
40 (Cal. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2856 (2009).  Although the U.S. Supreme Court denied 
certiorari in Geier, this action cannot be read as an implicit endorsement of Geier’s reasoning 
because Geier held, in the alternative, that even if constitutional error had occurred, it had been 
harmless.  See 161 P.3d at 140.  The California Supreme Court has granted review in several post-
Melendez-Diaz cases, presumably to resolve Geier’s fate.  See, e.g., People v. Benitez, 106 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 39 (Ct. App. 2010), rev. granted, 230 P.3d 117 (Cal. 2010); People v. Dungo, 98 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 702 (Ct. App. 2009), rev. granted, 220 P.3d 240 (Cal. 2009); People v. Gutierrez, 99 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 369 (Ct. App. 2009), rev. granted, 220 P.3d 239 (Cal. 2009); People v. Lopez, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
825 (Ct. App. 2009), rev. granted, 220 P.3d 240 (Cal. 2009); People v. Rutterschmidt, 98 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 390, 412 (Ct. App. 2009), rev. granted and op. superseded by, 220 P.3d 239 (Cal. 2009).  
 112. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2543 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting White v. 
Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
 113. See id. (quoting Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2693 (2008) (Thomas, J., 
concurring)). 
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E. Doctrinal Tangle 
He may have cast the tie-breaking vote in Melendez-Diaz, but 
Justice Thomas will not necessarily play the role of kingmaker in future 
Confrontation Clause cases.  Melendez-Diaz split the Court into three 
camps, but their views do not lie along a one-dimensional spectrum, 
with Justice Thomas alone in the middle.114  Four Justices believe that 
the Clause covers “testimonial” statements as defined in Crawford;115 
for Justice Thomas, the Clause reaches only “formalized testimonial 
materials” and comparably formal oral testimony—in essence, a subset 
of testimonial statements under Crawford; and four Justices would apply 
the Clause only to statements uttered by “conventional” witnesses that 
an objective declarant would anticipate could be used in a later 
prosecution, except when such statements were made under police 
interrogation to resolve an ongoing emergency.116  For five members of 
the Court, the statement was what mattered.  They would examine its 
content, context, purpose, and, for Justice Thomas, its formality, to 
determine whether it constitutes testimony, such that the declarant would 
be a witness within the Confrontation Clause.  The four Melendez-Diaz 
dissenters, however, would start with the declarant, asking whether he 
has perceived an event giving “him personal knowledge of some aspect 
of the defendant’s guilt.”117
This doctrinal discord has already produced a curious mix of 
results.  In Davis, a conventional witness’s statement was nontestimonial 
under Crawford, lacked formality, and related near-contemporaneous 
observations for the purpose of resolving an ongoing emergency, so the 
  If so, then he is a witness within the Clause.  
And if circumstances objectively indicated that his statements would be 
available for use at a later trial, but that enabling police interrogators to 
meet an ongoing emergency was not their primary purpose, then those 
statements would implicate the confrontation right. 
 
 114. But see G. Michael Fenner, Today’s Confrontation Clause (After Crawford and 
Melendez-Diaz), 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 35, 39-40 (2009) (contending that “[f]our Justices believe 
that the coverage of the Confrontation Clause is quite broad, four believe it is quite narrow, and 
Justice Thomas’s view falls in the middle”). 
 115. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in 
Melendez-Diaz as well as the majority opinions (also written by Justice Scalia) in Crawford and 
Davis. 
 116. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and Alito joined Justice Kennedy’s dissent in 
Melendez-Diaz as well as the majority opinion in Davis.  Justices Kennedy and Breyer were among 
the Crawford majority. 
 117. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2551 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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Court unanimously declined to find a right to confrontation.118  In 
Melendez-Diaz, where an unconventional witness’s testimonial 
statement satisfied Justice Thomas’s formality requirement, five 
members of the Court agreed that confrontation was necessary.119  But in 
Hammon, where a conventional witness’s statement was testimonial 
under Crawford but not formalized, the Court required confrontation, 
notwithstanding Justice Thomas’s contrary view.120
This proposition may serve as a rule of thumb for how the 
Melendez-Diaz Court would decide future cases, but it is hardly a 
constitutional rule.  Though rightly criticized for its failure to precisely 
define the universe of “testimonial” statements,
  Synthesized, these 
results support the following proposition:  a hearsay statement implicates 
the Confrontation Clause only if it is testimonial under Crawford and 
Davis, and only if either the declarant is a conventional witness or the 
statement bears sufficient hallmarks of formality. 
121 Crawford at least 
articulated a clear rule, apparently favored by a seven-member majority 
of the Court.122  In Davis and Hammon, Justice Thomas expressed a 
distinct interpretation of the Confrontation Clause that diverged from 
that followed by the Court, but consensus evidently reigned among the 
other eight Justices.  Giles v. California produced sharp divisions, but 
the dissenters did not question the underlying constitutional principle—
that anyone who makes a testimonial statement is a witness within the 
meaning of the Confrontation Clause.123
 
 118. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827-28 (2006); id. at 840 (Thomas, J., concurring 
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
  Melendez-Diaz, however, 
 119. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531-32; id. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 120. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 829-30; id. at 840 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 121. Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized this omission, noting that while the Court might be 
willing to leave the task of fully defining “testimonial” for another day, prosecutors would need 
such a definition immediately.  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 75-76 (2004) (Rehnquist, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (“Rules of criminal evidence are applied every day in courts 
throughout the country, and parties should not be left in the dark in this manner.”).  Commentators 
echoed these sentiments.  See, e.g., Brooks Holland, Testimonial Statements Under Crawford, 71 
BROOK. L. REV. 281, 281 (2005) (Crawford “cast[] a shadow of uncertainty over a major 
component of criminal practice”); Miguel A. Mendez, Crawford v. Washington: A Critique, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 569, 587 (2004) (citing uncertainty resulting from Crawford’s failure to define 
“testimonial” as chief among the decision’s costs). 
 122. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor concurred only in the judgment, explaining 
that they would not have overruled Roberts.  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
 123. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Kennedy, disagreed with the majority’s 
conclusion that a defendant forfeits his confrontation right by wrongdoing only when he committed 
the wrongful act for the purpose of rendering a witness unavailable.  See Giles v. California, 128 S. 
Ct. 2678, 2695, 2698-99 (2008). 
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marks an abrupt retreat from Crawford’s simplicity.  To be sure, 
Crawford remains good law, but it faces an uncertain future.  A mere six 
years after Crawford’s criminal-procedure revolution, only four Justices 
still endorsed its basic formula, and no single view of the Confrontation 
Clause held sway with a majority of the Court. 
Since the Court decided Melendez-Diaz, however, its composition 
has changed.  Two members of the majority, Justices Souter and 
Stevens, have retired and been replaced, respectively, by Justices 
Sotomayor and Kagan.  The basic Crawford formula has lost two of its 
four adherents.  Its future, and that of the Court’s Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence more broadly, will depend on the two newest Justices.124  
They will have an early opportunity to stake out their positions next 
term, when the Court will hear another Confrontation Clause case, 
Bryant v. Michigan, in which the Court will again consider confrontation 
of hearsay statements made under police interrogation.125
 
 124. After Justice Sotomayor joined the Court, it granted certiorari in Briscoe v. Virginia, and 
some commentators suggested that this spelled an early demise for Melendez-Diaz.  See Stephen 
Wills Murphy & Darryl K. Brown, The Confrontation Clause and the High Stakes of the Court’s 
Consideration of Briscoe v. Virginia, 95 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 97, 100 (2010).  In Briscoe, the 
Virginia Supreme Court assumed that a certificate of analysis akin to the one in Melendez-Diaz was 
testimonial but held that Briscoe had waived his confrontation right by failing to subpoena the 
analyst, as permitted by a Virginia statute.  See Magruder v. Virginia, 657 S.E.2d 113 (Va. 2008), 
cert. granted sub. nom. Briscoe v. Virginia, 129 S. Ct. 2858 (2009).  The case presented two issues:  
whether Briscoe had a right to confront the analyst, and if so, whether permitting him to subpoena 
the analyst satisfied the right.  When the Court accepted Briscoe a mere four days after issuing 
Melendez-Diaz—which had resolved the second issue as well as the first, albeit in dicta, see infra 
note 155—observers speculated that the addition of a former prosecutor to the Court had given the 
dissenters a fifth vote to overrule or limit Melendez-Diaz.  See Murphy & Brown, supra, at 99-100. 
 
The actual outcome was anticlimactic.  After full briefing and oral argument, the Court issued a 
terse per curiam opinion vacating and remanding the case for reconsideration in light of Melendez-
Diaz.  See 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010).  This result suggests either that Justice Sotomayor agreed in full 
with the Melendez-Diaz majority, or that she has joined the majority but may support future 
limitations on the decision.  See Murphy & Brown, supra, at 105-06. 
 125. See People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d 65 (Mich. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1685 (2010).  
Professor Richard Friedman, a prominent Confrontation Clause scholar whose writing influenced 
the Court’s decision in Crawford, see 541 U.S. at 61, anticipates that the Court will answer four 
questions in Bryant:  (1) whether the testimonial character of a statement made under police 
interrogation should be assessed from the speaker’s perspective or the interrogator’s; (2) whether a 
statement must be “formal” to be testimonial, and if so, whether that requirement is satisfied if an 
objective declarant would expect the statement to be available for prosecutorial use; (3) whether 
statements in response to police interrogation during an ongoing emergency are testimonial if they 
do not directly relate to resolving the emergency; and (4) whether the fact that a suspect remains at 
large qualifies as an ongoing emergency, even if he poses no immediate danger to the declarant.  
See Richard D. Friedman, More on Bryant, THE CONFRONTATION BLOG (Mar. 2, 2010, 8:30 AM), 
http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/.  
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III.  PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Melendez-Diaz may well represent Crawford’s swansong.  If so, 
Crawford has gone out with a bang.  As one reads the opinions, the 
doctrinal debate between the majority and the dissent pales in 
comparison to their fierce disagreement over the decision’s real-world 
impact.  Dismissing the decision’s practical benefits as “negligible,” the 
dissent charges that it will impose astronomical costs on federal, state, 
and local governments, and that “[g]uilty defendants will go free . . . as a 
direct result of today’s decision.” 126  The majority scoffs at these dire 
predictions, and it challenges the dissent’s assertion that cross-
examination of forensic analysts will prove an empty formalism.127
Neither the majority nor the dissent gets its cost-benefit analysis 
quite right.  The dissent exaggerates the decision’s costs, but the 
majority’s assessment is far too optimistic.  Compliance with Melendez-
Diaz will impose a substantial burden on government agencies and 
coffers, regardless of how narrowly lower courts construe the Court’s 
holding, and despite inherent limitations on its scope.  On the other side 
of the scales, however, both the majority and the dissent give short shrift 
to the decision’s potential benefits.  Cross-examination of forensic 
analysts will enable jurors to make better-informed reliability 
assessments of forensic evidence and will thereby serve the truth-
seeking function of criminal trials.  Moreover, it will afford defense 
counsel an opportunity to dispel the myth that forensic evidence is 
infallible.  Requiring forensic analysts to appear for cross-examination 
may, as the Melendez-Diaz dissent insists it will, result in some guilty 
defendants walking free, but it may also prevent the conviction of 
innocent defendants based on speculation disguised as science. 
 
I open this Part by assessing the practical costs of Melendez-Diaz.  I 
present and critique the dissent’s alarmist arguments as well as the 
majority’s sanguine ripostes before arguing that the reality falls 
somewhere in between.  I then turn to the decision’s benefits, framing 
my analysis of how cross-examination of forensic analysts will advance 
the truth-seeking process as a response to the Melendez-Diaz dissent. 
 
 126. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2549-50 (2009) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
 127. See id. at 2536-38, 2540-42 (majority opinion). 
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A. Costs 
Melendez-Diaz confirms that Crawford applies to forensic analysts 
and laboratory technicians who evaluate or perform tests on physical 
evidence.128  From now on, if prosecutors wish to introduce these 
persons’ testimonial hearsay into evidence, they must afford defendants 
the opportunity for cross-examination.129  While in hindsight, this rule 
follows logically from Crawford, many jurisdictions had not adopted 
it,130 and compliance in these jurisdictions will impose administrative 
and economic costs on government and the legal system.  As the dissent 
observes, given the often erratic schedules of criminal trials, a forensic 
analyst called to testify due to Melendez-Diaz may “face the prospect of 
waiting for days in a hallway outside the courtroom.”131
The magnitude of these costs will depend on how many cases 
Melendez-Diaz affects.  On this point, the majority and the dissent 
sharply diverge.  By the dissent’s calculations, Melendez-Diaz will derail 
countless prosecutions,
  Existing 
backlogs at public crime laboratories will balloon as analysts spend more 
time in court (or waiting outside) and less time in the lab.  Fiscally-
strapped state and local governments will struggle to hire sufficient 
additional staff to take up the slack.  In some cases, authors of forensic 
reports will be genuinely unavailable at the time of trial, and if their 
analyses are unrepeatable, and the prosecution’s case turns on forensic 
evidence, guilty defendants may be acquitted, imposing a cost on 
society. 
132 while the majority dismisses the dissent’s 
projections as preposterous.133
1. The Dissent’s Projections 
  In this section, I first present these 
competing views.  I then independently assess the decision’s real-world 
costs in light of inherent limitations on its scope, concluding that the 
truth lies in the vast gap between the two camps’ assessments. 
Routine drug prosecutions like Melendez-Diaz are ubiquitous:  in 
2004, more than 18,000 drug trials occurred in state courts.134
 
 128. See id. at 2532, 2536-38. 
  Counting 
 129. Id. at 2532. 
 130. The majority identifies ten jurisdictions (nine states and the District of Columbia) as 
already applying Crawford to forensic analysts.  Id. at 2540, 2541 n.11.  Thus, in forty-one states, 
Melendez-Diaz will require a change in practice.  
 131. See id. at 2549 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 132. See id. at 2549-50. 
 133. See id. at 2540 n.10 (majority opinion). 
 134. Id. at 2550 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
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plea bargains—in which the admissible evidence available to the 
prosecution almost certainly influenced defendants’ decisions to forgo 
trial—the states chalked up 362,850 felony drug convictions in that same 
year.135  Translating these numbers to the local level, the dissent 
calculates that requiring confrontation of laboratory technicians who 
weigh and identify controlled substances will impose “a crushing 
burden.”136  Based on the number of drug prosecutions in 2007, and 
assuming a 95% plea bargain rate, each of Philadelphia’s 18 drug 
analysts would be called to testify in more than 69 trials each year, and 
each of Cleveland’s six analysts would be summoned in 117 cases.137
If these figures were to prove accurate, Melendez-Diaz would have 
staggering consequences for drug prosecutions nationwide.  And as the 
dissent emphasizes, the decision may affect not just drug cases, but all 
cases in which the prosecution relies on forensic analyses.  Given that 
the FBI crime lab’s 500 employees “conduct over one million scientific 
tests each year,” “[t]he Court’s decision means that before any one of 
those million tests reaches a jury, at least one of the laboratory’s analysts 
must board a plane, find his or her way to an unfamiliar courthouse, and 
sit there waiting to read aloud notes made months ago.”
 
138 And the 
decision may compel more than one of those analysts to follow these 
steps. The dissent contends that Melendez-Diaz can be read to require 
that every person who plays a role in conducting a forensic test—even 
the contractor who calibrates the testing equipment—appear in court.139  
Indeed, in the dissent’s view, the decision can be read to require live 
testimony for every link in the chain of custody for a piece of 
evidence,140 and even require custodians to take the stand to attest to the 
accuracy of the copies of records they provide.141
 Securing court appearances by all of these persons would present 
a formidable logistical hurdle for the prosecution.  To capitalize on that 
fact, the dissent contends, a defendant will inevitably assert his right to 
confront each and every one of them.
 
142  He may thereby hope to 
negotiate a more favorable plea agreement or reduced sentence;143
 
 135. Id. at 2549. 
 to 
create delays that will lead to dismissal of the case on speedy trial 
 136. Id. at 2550. 
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. 
 139. See id. at 2544-45. 
 140. See id. at 2546. 
 141. See id. at 2546-47. 
 142. See id. at 2556-57. 
 143. Id. at 2557. 
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grounds; or, “where scientific evidence is necessary to prove an element 
of the crime,” to earn an acquittal if the analyst is unavailable to 
testify.144  Indeed, the dissent argues, defense attorneys’ duty of zealous 
advocacy will oblige them to put the prosecution to its proof by 
demanding live testimony, even where the defense does not dispute the 
identity of a substance or the source of other trace evidence.145
Viewed from this perspective, the dissent’s prediction that 
Melendez-Diaz may “disrupt or even end criminal prosecutions” looks 
plausible.  The criminal justice system might well collapse if, whenever 
forensic evidence is introduced, every person who played a role in its 
collection, processing, and analysis were required to provide live 
testimony, and if live testimony were likewise required to authenticate 
every document and to prove every link in the chain of custody for every 
item. 
 
2.  The Majority’s Response 
According to the majority, however, the dissent’s “back-of-the-
envelope calculations regarding the number of court appearances that 
will result from [its] ruling . . . rely on various unfounded 
assumptions.”146
that the prosecution will place into evidence a drug analysis certificate 
in every case; that the defendant will never stipulate to the nature of 
the controlled substance; [and] that even where no such stipulation is 
made, every defendant will object to the evidence or otherwise demand 
the appearance of the analyst.
  The dissent assumes: 
147
None of these assumptions is valid. 
 
First, when the prosecution must prove the weight and/or identity of 
a controlled substance to make out its prima facie case, it may do so 
through means other than a drug certificate.148
 
 144. Id. at 2556. 
  This is equally true for 
other forms of forensic evidence.  Some prosecutors’ existing practice 
may be to call testing analysts to deliver their results on the witness 
stand.  In the drugs context, prosecutors might also choose to present 
testimony from an arresting officer if he is able to discern a substance’s 
identity based on experience and observations.  Or test results may be 
offered not for their truth, but as part of the factual basis for a testifying 
 145. See id. at 2556-57. 
 146. See id. at 2540 n.10 (majority opinion). 
 147. Id. 
 148. See id. at 2542 n.14. 
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expert’s opinion, in theory placing them outside Crawford.149
Second, the majority opines, “[d]efense attorneys and their clients 
will often stipulate to the nature of the substance in the ordinary drug 
case.”
  A 
prosecutor will rarely confront situations in which an analyst’s 
testimonial hearsay is the sole means by which he can prove an element 
of his case beyond a reasonable doubt. 
150  Where the defendant does not contest a substance’s identity—
for example, where the defense theory is that the defendant did not 
knowingly possess the drugs,151 or that they were for personal use and 
not intended for sale—the majority deems it “unlikely that defense 
counsel would insist on live testimony whose effect will be merely to 
highlight rather than cast doubt on the forensic analysis,” or “to 
antagonize the judge or jury by wasting their time with the appearance of 
a witness whose testimony defense counsel does not intend to rebut in 
any fashion.”152
Third, it is not necessarily true that every defendant will assert his 
confrontation right.  Indeed, according to the majority, many states 
already follow the rule announced in Melendez-Diaz, while many others 
empower a defendant to demand confrontation but deem the right 
waived if the defendant fails to assert it within a given time period after 
“receiving notice of the prosecution’s intent to use a forensic analyst’s 
report.”
 
153  That “the criminal justice system has not ground to a halt” in 
these states strongly suggests that defendants often waive confrontation 
of forensic analysts.154  Further, in some other states, including 
Massachusetts, “a defendant may subpoena the analyst to appear at trial, 
and yet there is no indication that obstructionist defendants are abusing 
that privilege.”155
 
 149. See infra Part III.A.3.b. 
 
 150. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2542. 
 151. Melendez-Diaz’s defense theory was that “the prosecution had not shown that he had 
possessed or dealt in the drugs.”  Id. at 2548 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 152. Id. at 2542 (majority opinion). 
 153. See id. at 2540-41. 
 154. See id. at 2541. 
 155. Id. (citation omitted).  Elsewhere in its opinion, the Court explains that empowering a 
defendant to subpoena the analyst will not satisfy the Confrontation Clause.  See id. at 2540.  “[T]he 
Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the 
defendant to bring those adverse witnesses into court.”  Id.  “Converting the prosecution’s duty 
under the Confrontation Clause into the defendant’s privilege under state law or the Compulsory 
Process Clause [unfairly] shifts the consequences of adverse-witness no-shows from the State to the 
accused.”  Id.  Nevertheless, states remain “free to adopt procedural rules governing” a defendant’s 
exercise of his confrontation right.  Id. at 2541.  Although the Court declined to establish a 
taxonomy of acceptable and unacceptable rules, see id. at 2541 n.12, it did address two common 
procedural schemes.  Notice-and-demand statutes that merely “require the prosecution to provide 
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In short, the majority dismisses the dissent’s assumptions, and its 
projections, as “wildly unrealistic.”156  It also brushes aside the dissent’s 
expansive reading of its holding, assuring the reader that “we do not 
hold, and it is not the case, that anyone whose testimony may be relevant 
in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or 
accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part of the 
prosecution’s case.”157  “‘[G]aps in the chain [of custody] normally go to 
the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility,’” and it remains 
“up to the prosecution to decide what steps . . . are so crucial as to 
require evidence.”158  Further, maintenance and calibration records “may 
well qualify as nontestimonial.”159  The majority closes with a confident 
pronouncement:  “there is little reason to believe that our decision today 
will commence the parade of horribles respondent and the dissent 
predict.”160
3.  The Reality 
 
On one hand, the majority’s assurances underestimate the inevitable 
consequences of Melendez-Diaz.  Given the enormous number of drug 
trials that occur in the United States each year, prosecutors almost 
certainly rely on drug certificates in hundreds, if not thousands, of cases.  
This number balloons when one considers that prosecutors may offer 
other forensic evidence, such as latent fingerprint or ballistics analyses, 
through sworn certificates.  Defendants may sometimes stipulate to test 
 
notice to the defendant of its intent to use an analyst’s report as evidence at trial, after which the 
defendant is given a period of time in which he may” demand the analyst’s live testimony, are 
constitutional.  Id. at 2541 & n.12.  Statutes that require the defendant himself to subpoena the 
analyst are not.  See id. at 2540.  The Court granted certiorari in a case raising the constitutionality 
of such a statute only four days after issuing its decision in Melendez-Diaz.  See Magruder v. 
Virginia, 657 S.E.2d 113 (Va. 2008), cert. granted sub. nom. Briscoe v. Virginia, 129 S. Ct. 2858 
(2009).  After full briefing and oral argument, however, the Court issued a terse per curiam opinion 
vacating and remanding the case for reconsideration in light of Melendez-Diaz.  See Briscoe v. 
Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316, 1316 (2010). 
  Before Melendez-Diaz, states’ procedural rules governing confrontation of forensic 
analysts varied widely.  For an authoritative survey explaining why most are facially 
unconstitutional under Crawford, see Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. 
REV. 475 (2006).  Cf. Jennifer B. Sokoler, Note, Between Substance and Procedure:  A Role for 
States’ Interests in the Scope of the Confrontation Clause, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 161 (2010) 
(proposing a framework for assessing the constitutionality of states’ procedural rules post-
Melendez-Diaz that balances the defendant’s right to confrontation with states’ interests). 
 156. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540 n.10. 
 157. Id. at 2532 n.1. 
 158. Id. (quoting United States v. Lott, 854 F.2d 244, 250 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
 159. See id. 
 160. Id. at 2542. 
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results or decline to exercise their confrontation rights, and in some 
states, Melendez-Diaz will not require a change in practice.  Still, the 
decision will surely result in a sizable increase in court appearances by 
forensic analysts, simply because prosecutors use forensic analyses so 
frequently.161  Moreover, the Court may not have held that the 
prosecution must call everyone whose testimony may be relevant to 
authentication or identification, but “what testimony is introduced must 
(if the defendant objects) be introduced live.”162
Yet on the other hand, the outlook is not so bleak as the dissent 
would have us believe.  The dissent overlooks—and the majority does 
not discuss—a fundamental limitation on the reach of Melendez-Diaz:  
like the Confrontation Clause, it applies only to testimonial hearsay.
  Existing practice in 
many jurisdictions may not conform to this standard. 
163
a.  Testimonial Statements under Melendez-Diaz 
  
Melendez-Diaz matters only when the prosecution offers a forensic 
analyst’s testimonial statement into evidence for its truth.  While all 
sworn drug certificates are necessarily testimonial under Melendez-Diaz, 
forensic analysts produce, and prosecutors introduce, many other forms 
of documentary evidence embodying and supporting forensic analyses, 
some of which may not be testimonial.  Moreover, when one forensic 
analyst’s work product emerges in the courtroom only as part of the 
factual basis for a testifying expert’s opinion, Melendez-Diaz may not 
apply.  Unpacking each of these considerations will provide a more 
nuanced picture of the costs Melendez-Diaz will impose on the criminal 
justice system. 
Although the Court’s conclusion in Melendez-Diaz relies on 
Crawford, the term “testimonial” carries different meanings in the two 
decisions.164  In light of Justice Thomas’s concurrence, only formal 
statements are testimonial under Melendez-Diaz.165
 
 161. See COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY. ET AL., NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES:  A PATH FORWARD 86 (2009) [hereinafter, NRC REPORT] (“Forensic science 
experts and evidence are routinely used in the service of the criminal justice system.”). 
  Even thus 
circumscribed, the decision may affect many categories of forensic 
evidence.  I discuss three of them here:  forensic analysts’ unsworn 
 162. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.1. 
 163. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823-24 (2006). 
 164. See supra Part II.D. 
 165. See id. 
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reports, equipment calibration and maintenance records, and chain-of-
custody documents.  
b.  Forensic Analysts’ Unsworn Reports 
Prosecutors increasingly rely on a wide array166 of forensic 
disciplines to sway jurors conditioned by the media to expect forensic 
evidence.167  In a given case, a prosecutor may offer live testimony 
describing a forensic analysis and its conclusions, a forensic analyst’s 
report, or both.  Melendez-Diaz potentially comes into play only when 
live testimony is omitted altogether, or when the live witness is not the 
report’s author.  Under Melendez-Diaz, a report is testimonial if it is, in 
effect if not in name, a sworn affidavit; but some unsworn reports might 
conceivably satisfy Justice Thomas’s formality requirement.168
To meet that criterion, unsworn reports must resemble “formalized 
testimonial materials” such as affidavits, depositions, and prior 
testimony, or bear “indicia of formality” akin to the ritual of informing a 
suspect of his Miranda rights.
 
169  Justice Thomas categorizes affidavits 
and depositions as testimonial because they “are, by their very nature, 
taken through a formalized process.”170
 
 166. See generally NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 127-72 (describing some of the “major” 
forensic disciplines). 
  He has not specifically 
identified what makes the process “formalized” in his view, but logic 
suggests two possibilities.  Depositions, for example, are structured in 
that they follow specific, established procedures, but deponents also 
swear an oath at the outset, conferring a degree of solemnity to the 
proceedings.  Regardless of which characteristic Justice Thomas has in 
mind, they both convey to the deponent the gravity of the occasion and 
the importance of speaking truthfully, just as administering Miranda 
warnings puts a suspect on notice that serious consequences may follow 
from his subsequent statements.  For Justice Thomas, a formalized 
statement seems to be one made under circumstances that prompt the 
 167. See infra note 340. 
 168. At least one commentator has reasoned that Justice Thomas would have joined the 
majority in Melendez-Diaz even had the drug certificate not included a formal oath.  See Bennett L. 
Gershman, Confronting Scientific Reports Under Crawford v. Washington, 29 PACE L. REV. 479, 
495 (2009).  Cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 n.3 (2004) (“We find it implausible that a 
provision which concededly condemned trial by sworn ex parte affidavit thought trial by unsworn 
ex parte affidavit perfectly OK.”). 
 169. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 170. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 836-37 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part). 
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speaker to soberly consider his words and that incentivize him to tell the 
truth. 
When might an unsworn report fit the bill?  Suppose, for example, 
that a forensic laboratory requires its analysts to write reports using 
standardized forms and assigns supervisors to review the reports for 
accuracy and completeness.  The use of forms would constrain the 
content of analysts’ statements, pressing them to construct answers to 
specific questions (as at a deposition), and the review procedures would 
encourage rigor and thoroughness.  Unsworn forensic reports produced 
according to these or similar procedures might qualify as formalized 
testimonial materials. 
One lower-court decision applying Melendez-Diaz suggests two 
further limitations.  In People v. Brown, the New York Court of Appeals 
concluded that a private laboratory’s unsworn report—consisting of 
“machine-generated raw data, graphs and charts” reflecting the DNA 
characteristics of a male specimen extracted from a rape kit—was non-
testimonial.171
First, the report consisted only of machine-generated information, 
not subjective conclusions or analyses.
  Two of the court’s rationales for this conclusion 
highlight the limits of Melendez-Diaz. 
172  As several courts have held, 
machines cannot testify, and machine-generated data do not constitute 
the testimonial statements of the machine’s operator.173
 
 171. 918 N.E.2d 927, 928-33 (N.Y. 2009).  
  The laboratory 
technicians in Brown undoubtedly took actions, such as preparing 
samples and triggering chemical reactions, that affected the ultimate 
report, but they did not make statements.  And only statements implicate 
 172. Id. at 931-32.  The prosecution called, and Brown was able to cross-examine, the forensic 
biologist who actually analyzed the raw data in the lab report, compared it to Brown’s DNA profile, 
and concluded that the two likely shared the same origin.  See id. at 931. 
 173. See, e.g., United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Confrontation 
Clause does not forbid the use of raw data produced by scientific instruments, though the 
interpretation of those data may be testimonial.”); United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 230 
(4th Cir. 2007) (“The raw data generated by the diagnostic machines are the ‘statements’ of the 
machines themselves, not their operators.”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2856 (2009).  But cf. State v. 
Bullcoming 226 P.3d 1, 4-6, 9 (N.M. 2010) (holding that a laboratory report including, inter alia, 
unsworn certifications and the results of blood-alcohol measurements conducted with a gas 
chromatograph, was testimonial because it was formalized, had been made for the purpose of 
proving past facts, and had been offered to prove an essential element of the prosecution’s case, but 
deeming the technician who wrote the report “a mere scrivener” of output from the gas 
chromatograph machine, which was “Defendant’s true ‘accuser’”). 
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the Confrontation Clause.174
Second, the laboratory that generated the report in Brown was 
independent of law enforcement.
  Where unsworn forensic reports consist 
wholly of machine-generated data, Melendez-Diaz will not apply. 
175  Unlike government-operated labs, 
commercial laboratories analyze samples for a variety of clients, such as 
individuals seeking to confirm paternity or to ascertain whether they 
share genetic markers for hereditary diseases.176  Thus, when an analyst 
prepares his report, he may not know the client’s identity or motive for 
requesting the test.  In contrast, many public crime laboratories perform 
forensic analyses primarily (or solely) to facilitate the identification and 
prosecution of criminals.  Thus, whereas an objective state crime lab 
employee “‘would reasonably . . . believe that [his report] would be 
available for use at a later trial,’”177 the same cannot necessarily be said 
of analysts at private labs.  As a result, their reports may often be 
nontestimonial.178
Along with Justice Thomas’s concurrence, these distinctions 
between public and private laboratories, and between human 
observations and machine-generated data, may place many unsworn 
forensic reports outside the scope of Melendez-Diaz. 
 
c.  Equipment Calibration & Maintenance Records 
When a prosecutor relies on measurements or tests to make his 
case, he may wish to demonstrate their reliability—or to refute the 
defendant’s charges of inaccuracy—by showing that the equipment used 
to conduct them had been properly maintained and calibrated.  Rather 
than locate and subpoena the maintenance technician, however, the 
prosecutor might simply introduce written records.  After Melendez-
Diaz, are such records testimonial?  In dicta, the Melendez-Diaz Court 
declared that “it is not the case[] that anyone whose testimony may be 
relevant in establishing . . . the accuracy of the testing device[] must 
appear in person as part of the prosecution’s case,” and that “documents 
prepared in the regular course of equipment maintenance may well 
 
 174. Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 (explaining that the Clause is concerned only with testimonial 
hearsay); FED. R. EVID. 801 (defining hearsay as out-of-court statements offered for the truth of 
what they assert). 
 175. Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 932. 
 176. See Fenner, supra note 114, at 62. 
 177. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009) (quoting Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004). 
 178. This rationale applies equally to calibration and maintenance records for private 
laboratories’ equipment. 
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qualify as nontestimonial records.”179
The vast majority of courts considering this issue have found 
maintenance and calibration records to be nontestimonial.
  The Court ultimately left the 
question open, however, and lower courts have now begun to wrestle 
with it. 
180  Some have 
read the dicta quoted in the previous paragraph as carving out an 
exception for these records.181  Others have reasoned that such records 
contain only “neutral” information used to prove “collateral facts” that 
are outside the Sixth Amendment, that calibration records “do not 
pertain to any particular defendant or specific case,” and that calibrating 
technicians “do not know which certificates, if any, will be used in 
litigation.”182
Two New York trial courts have held that breathalyzer maintenance 
and calibration records are testimonial.
 
183  In these cases, because the 
challenged records took the form of sworn certificates, and because they 
had been “made under circumstances which would lead an objective 
witness reasonably to believe [they] would be available for use later at 
trial,” the courts found them indistinguishable, for constitutional 
purposes, from the affidavit in Melendez-Diaz.184  In People v. Carreira, 
the court acknowledged its minority position but could not escape the 
conclusion that the calibration records had been “prepared expressly for 
use in litigation.”185  That calibration and maintenance records prove 
only collateral facts was irrelevant because Crawford does not 
“discriminate between . . . direct and indirect evidence.”186
 
 179. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.1. 
  And given 
that law enforcement personnel create the records for use by other law 
enforcement personnel, they could hardly be characterized as 
 180. See, e.g., United States v. Bacas, 662 F. Supp. 2d 481, 484-86 (E.D. Va. 2009) (tuning 
forks); United States v. Forstell, 656 F. Supp. 2d 578, 580-81 (E.D. Va. 2009) (radar gun, tuning 
forks, and Intoxilyzer); State v. Fitzwater, 227 P.3d 520, 540 (Haw. 2010) (speedometer); People v. 
DiBari, 26 Misc. 3d 1220(A), 2010 WL 432361, at *4 (N.Y. Just. Ct. Feb. 8, 2010) (Intoxilyzer); 
People v. Harvey, 26 Misc. 3d 1218(A), 2010 WL 376935, at *3 (N.Y. Just. Ct. Feb. 4, 2010); 
People v. Kelly, 26 Misc.3d 1205(A), 2009 WL 5183779, at *4 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. Dec. 22, 2009) 
(Intoxilyzer); State v. Bergin, 217 P.3d 1087, 1088-90 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (Intoxilyzer). 
 181. See, e.g., Forstell, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 581; Fitzwater, 227 P.3d at 540; DiBari, 2010 WL 
432361, at *3. 
 182. Bacas, 662 F. Supp. 2d at 485; accord Bergin, 217 P.3d at 1089-90 (also noting that 
challenged Intoxilyzer calibration certificate was unsworn). 
 183. People v. Carreira, 893 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846-47 (City Ct. 2010) (Intoxilyzer); People v. 
Heyanka, 886 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (Dist. Ct. 2009) (Intoxilyzer).  
 184. See Carreira, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 846; Heyanka, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 802. 
 185. See 893 N.Y.S.2d at 847. 
 186. Id. at 848. 
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“neutral.”187  Indeed, state law mandated breathalyzer machine 
certification “precisely because evidence produced using them will end 
up in court (most likely criminal court) and the People want to ensure 
their accuracy for prosecutorial purposes.”188  “But for the need to prove 
DWI in court, these procedures and records would not exist.”189
Test result admissibility is the raison d’être of breathalyzer 
calibration records, but Carreira’s analysis fails to account for a 
distinctive feature of these records, and one on which some courts have 
relied, post-Melendez-Diaz, in holding them nontestimonial.
   
190  That is, 
breathalyzer calibration records are created for a general prosecutorial 
purpose, but not for the prosecution of any particular offense or 
defendant.191  Both Crawford and Melendez-Diaz speak broadly of 
affidavits and of statements “made under circumstances which would 
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe” they “would be 
available for use at a later trial.”192  Neither opinion, on its face, suggests 
that an affidavit is nontestimonial unless sworn out in a specific case, or 
that the objective witness must anticipate a statement’s use in a 
particular trial for it to be testimonial.  Thus, to rely on this distinction to 
exempt breathalyzer calibration records from the Confrontation Clause, 
one must read a proviso into Crawford.193
Such a proviso might well square with the text of the Confrontation 
Clause.  The Clause guarantees a defendant’s right “to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him.”
 
194
 
 187. See id.  
  The phrase “witnesses against him” 
could refer to all whose statements are used against the defendant at 
trial, or it could refer to those who bore testimony against him—this 
defendant.  In the latter case, breathalyzer calibration records would fall 
outside the Clause.  For example, consider a calibration record, 
introduced at trial against DWI defendant Dan, and created by technician 
 188. Id. at 847. 
 189. Id. at 848. 
 190. See supra note 182. 
 191. This argument had gained currency before Melendez-Diaz, when courts almost uniformly 
concluded that breathalyzer calibration records are nontestimonial.  See Mnookin, supra note 19 at 
846-48.   
 192. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531-32 (2009); Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004).   
 193. Before Melendez-Diaz, at least one commentator proposed that Crawford should be 
modified in this fashion.  See Mnookin, supra note 19, at 849.  Cf. Fenner, supra note 114, at 75 
(examining “whether the Confrontation Clause’s primary-purpose test requires a primary purpose 
related to a particular crime, series of crimes, or criminal enterprise” in the context of forensic 
reports). 
 194. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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Tom months before Dan’s offense.  Tom’s statements have been used 
against Dan, but when he made them, Tom was not, in any ordinary 
sense of the words, a “witness against” Dan.195
For now, however, Melendez-Diaz is the law of the land.  While 
many courts have placed great stock in that decision’s dicta, the Court 
stopped short of saying that equipment calibration and maintenance 
records are nontestimonial.  It may not “be the case[] that anyone whose 
testimony may be relevant in establishing the  . . . accuracy of the testing 
device must” testify, but “what testimony is introduced must . . . be 
introduced live.”
 
 196
d.  Chain of Custody 
  Stated differently, nothing obliges a prosecutor to 
establish a testing device’s accuracy, but if he does so, using testimony, 
that testimony must be live.  And whatever the Melendez-Diaz Court 
may have said in dicta, its holding compels the conclusion that—at least 
with respect to breathalyzers and their ilk—maintenance and calibration 
records constitute testimony. 
Under most jurisdictions’ rules, the proponent of physical or 
documentary evidence must offer supporting evidence sufficient to 
sustain a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it to be.197  
To the extent that prosecutors have in the past met this burden through 
sworn certifications, they must now present live testimony.198
For example, before Melendez-Diaz, a prosecutor might have 
introduced a handgun found at a crime scene through the testimony of 
the investigating officer who initially seized the gun, or through that of 
the ballistics expert who ultimately performed tests on it.  Even 
assuming that both of these end-point witnesses testify, various law 
enforcement personnel will likely have handled the weapon in the 
interim.  To prove that the tested gun was the same gun seized at the 
crime scene, the prosecutor might introduce a chain-of-custody form, 
signed or initialed by the intermediate handlers, and recording the dates 
and times of each transfer among them.  This form might also 
 
 
 195. Of course, “him” should not be construed too literally.  As Mnookin suggests, a statement 
made for the purpose of “investigating a specific criminal act” before police have identified a 
suspect should not be treated differently from a statement offered to inculpate a particular 
individual.  See Mnookin, supra note 19, at 849.  In both instances, the witness should reasonably 
anticipate that his statement will be used in a particular trial.  
 196. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.1. 
 197. See FED. R. EVID. 901(a). 
 198. An exception to this rule may exist for certifications from public records custodians.  See 
supra notes 37-51 and accompanying text..  
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incorporate preprinted language to the effect that, by signing, each 
signatory affirms that he received and/or relinquished custody of the 
specified item at the dates and times provided, and that he possessed the 
item continuously and without altering it during the intervening period.  
The prosecutor could thus present an unbroken chain of custody to the 
jury.  But, thanks to the preprinted language, this chain-of-custody form 
looks an awful lot like an affidavit, and post-Melendez-Diaz, the 
prosecutor cannot introduce it unless the defendant has an opportunity to 
cross-examine each and every signatory. 
Removing the preprinted language might not change the outcome.  
A law enforcement officer who signs a chain-of-custody form would 
reasonably expect the document to later be used in a criminal 
prosecution.  Such forms exist principally due to the requirement that 
trial evidence be authenticated.  And depending on the nature of the 
form and the circumstances surrounding its completion—if, for example, 
officers receive extensive training on the forms and their purpose and 
know that supervisors and prosecutors will review the forms to ensure 
that all periods of time are properly accounted for—even Justice Thomas 
might agree that removal of the oath would not render the document 
non-testimonial.199
Melendez-Diaz thus forces prosecutors to confront a new dilemma 
in establishing chain of custody.  While the threshold for admission—
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item passed from crime 
scene to courtroom without alteration
 
200—is low, the threshold of juror 
persuasion may be higher.  Yet, coordinating with additional witnesses 
will burden the prosecutor, and their testimony will consume more of the 
court’s and jurors’ time.  Prosecutors must carefully weigh these 
conflicting incentives when deciding “what steps in the chain of custody 
are so crucial as to require evidence.”201
At first blush, the effects of implementing this rule appear 
sweeping, but they will likely prove minimal.  Law enforcement can 
adapt by eliminating unnecessary intermediate links in the chain of 
custody.  And in the courtroom, excluding standardized forms that 
exhaustively establish the chain will not necessarily lead jurors to 
systematically doubt the provenance of evidence.  Prosecutors may 
 
 
 199. See supra pp. 34-35. 
 200. See, e.g., United States v. Mendel, 746 F.2d 155, 167 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting United 
States v. Howard-Arias, 629 F.2d 363, 366 (4th Cir. 1982) (“The ultimate question is whether the 
authentication testimony is sufficiently complete so as to convince the court of the improbability 
that the original item had been exchanged with another or otherwise tampered with.”). 
 201. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.1.   
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choose to present one or two additional live witnesses where the chain of 
custody is particularly attenuated, or to rebut allegations of evidence 
tampering.  In most cases, however, experts and fact witnesses whom the 
prosecution would have called anyway will establish the chain with 
sufficient completeness to satisfy jurors.202
e.  Evidence Used “Not For its Truth” 
 
Crawford confirms that the Confrontation Clause “does not bar the 
use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the 
truth of the matter asserted,”203
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert witness may rely 
on otherwise inadmissible evidence in forming the opinion to which he 
will testify, so long as that evidence is of the sort on which experts in his 
field typically rest their professional judgments.
 and Melendez-Diaz does not purport to 
alter that rule.  Thus, Melendez-Diaz does not preclude a forensic 
report’s admission if the prosecution offers it for a non-hearsay purpose, 
such as illustrating the factual basis for a testifying expert’s opinion. 
204  Most states have 
adopted similar rules.205  But may the expert then disclose the basis for 
his opinion on the stand, even if that information would otherwise be 
excluded?  On one hand, disclosure enables jurors to evaluate the 
expert’s reasoning and thereby assists them in determining how much 
credibility and weight to give the expert’s opinion.206
 
 202. The dissent contends that under the Court’s holding, when a defendant “challenges the 
procedures for a secure chain of custody,” the prosecution must call, in its case-in-chief, “each 
person who is in the chain of custody—and who had an undoubted opportunity to taint or tamper 
with the evidence.”  Id. at 2549 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  This contention thoroughly misconstrues 
the Court’s holding.  As a baseline, prosecutors must satisfy the standard for admissibility, but the 
rules of evidence, not Melendez-Diaz, dictate this requirement.  See FED. R. EVID. 901(a).  Beyond 
that low threshold, whether to establish the chain of custody in greater detail is within a prosecutor’s 
discretion.  See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.1.  If the defendant alleges that evidence was 
contaminated or tampered with, the prosecutor can choose to rebut those allegations, but Melendez-
Diaz does not require that he do so.  Instead, Melendez-Diaz simply restricts the means by which 
prosecutors can prove chain-of-custody, both in meeting the standard for admissibility and in 
establishing the chain with greater certainty: unless Crawford’s requirements are met, they cannot 
use testimonial hearsay.  See id.  Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, the decision does not “control[] 
who[m] the prosecution must call,” but rather, how it may present their testimony.  See id. at 2549 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
  Yet on the other 
hand, putting evidence before the jury for this supposedly limited 
purpose poses the risk that jurors will use that evidence for its truth, as 
well.  Indeed, jurors must evaluate an expert’s sources in order to 
 203. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59  n.9 (2004). 
 204. See FED. R. EVID. 703 & advisory committee’s note. 
 205. Mnookin, supra note 19, at 802. 
 206. Id. 
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rationally evaluate his reasoning, and doing so “will inevitably involve a 
judgment about the likelihood that the sources themselves are valid and 
worthy of reliance.”207  In light of these competing considerations, 
evidence rules subject disclosure to a balancing test.  In federal court and 
a few states, the probative value of disclosure must substantially 
outweigh the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant.208  In most states, 
however, the rules strongly favor disclosure, allowing it unless the risk 
substantially outweighs the reward.209
After Crawford, some courts held that when another witness’s 
testimonial statements form the factual basis of an expert’s opinion, the 
Confrontation Clause prohibits those statements’ disclosure to the 
jury.
 
210  Other courts, however, allowed expert witnesses to disclose 
others’ forensic analyses on the stand and even admitted absent analysts’ 
reports on the theory that, even if this evidence was testimonial, it was 
not hearsay.211
This split of authority persists post-Melendez-Diaz.  Courts in 
Illinois and Indiana have upheld “surrogate” expert testimony regarding 
the content of forensic reports under the not-for-its-truth rationale.
 
212  
But other courts have held that the Confrontation Clause forbids the 
admission of one forensic analyst’s testimonial statements through the 
in-court testimony of another.213
 
 207. Id. at 816. 
  Still other courts have taken a more 
nuanced approach, differentiating between an expert who merely parrots 
 208. See FED. R. EVID. 703; Mnookin, supra note 19, at 804. 
 209. See Mnookin, supra note 19, at 804. 
 210. See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 198-99 (2d Cir. 2008); Roberts v. United 
States, 916 A.2d 922, 937-39 (D.C. 2007); People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727, 732-34 (N.Y. 
2005). 
 211. See, e.g., State v. Tucker, 160 P.3d 177, 193-94 (Ariz. 2007); State v. Delaney, 613 S.E.2d 
699, 700-01 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005); State v. Barton, 709 N.W.2d 93, 95-98 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005).   
 212. See, e.g., People v. Lovejoy, 919 N.E.2d 843, 867-70 (Ill. 2009); Pendergrass v. State, 889 
N.E.2d 861, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that admission of absent forensic analyst’s reports 
did not violate defendant’s confrontation right because reports were not admitted for their truth, but 
to provide context for testifying expert’s opinion), vacated by, 913 N.E.2d 703, 707-09 (Ind. 2009) 
(holding that admission of absent forensic analysts’ reports did not violate defendant’s confrontation 
right because opportunity to cross-examine non-authoring experts satisfied the right, adding that 
reports were not hearsay because they were admitted as sources on which expert relied), cert. 
denied, 2010 WL 197668 (2010).  See also People v. Barba, No. B185940, 2010 WL 571950, at *9-
10 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2010); People v. Rutterschmidt, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 410-13 (Ct. App. 
2009), review granted and. superseded by, 220 P.3d 239 (Cal. 2009). 
 213. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Avila, 912 N.E.2d 1014, 1027-29 (Mass. 2009); Wood v. 
State, 299 S.W.3d 200, 207-14 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009).  See also Steven N. Yermish, Melendez-Diaz 
and the Application of Crawford in the Lab, CHAMPION, Aug. 2009, at 28, 31 (asserting that 
“Melendez-Diaz confirms the position that an expert cannot testify about lab test reports without 
confrontation of the person who did the underlying analysis”).  
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another’s opinions and one who cites others’ factual findings to support 
his own conclusions.214
This practice plainly conforms to the letter of Crawford, but 
whether it comports with the spirit of that decision is another matter 
altogether.  Crawford sought to uncouple Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence from the rules of evidence.
  These analyses lack uniformity, but they 
illustrate a broader point:  even after Melendez-Diaz, some prosecutors 
can still put non-testifying forensic analysts’ work product before the 
jury, albeit ostensibly for a limited, non-hearsay purpose. 
215  In overturning the rule that 
statements falling within “firmly-rooted” hearsay exceptions were 
exempt from confrontation, the Court declared that “[w]here testimonial 
statements are involved,” the Framers did not “mean[] to leave the Sixth 
Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence.”216  
Yet it is the rules of evidence that allow admission of testimonial 
statements through expert witnesses under the fiction that jurors will not 
consider them for their truth.  Knowledge of the facts on which an expert 
based his opinion enables jurors to better assess the expert’s testimony, 
but it does so only by allowing them to judge whether the expert relied 
on sound sources.217  “To make rational use of this evidence, a factfinder 
must first assess the likelihood that it is worth relying upon”218
In short, the “not-for-its-truth” rationale is an intellectually 
disingenuous means to circumvent Crawford, and I do not discuss it here 
in order to advocate its adoption.  Unless and until the Supreme Court 
closes this loophole, however, courts will remain free to admit 
testimonial forensic analyses through expert witness testimony, and this 
—i.e., 
whether it is true.  And once jurors have considered the truth of factual-
basis evidence, it strains credulity to suggest that they will simply ignore 
that evidence when addressing the substantive question of guilt or 
innocence. 
 
 214. See, e.g., Rector v. State, 681 S.E.2d 157, 160 (Ga. 2009); State v. Locklear, 681 S.E.2d 
293, 304-05 (N.C. 2009); State v. Lui, 221 P.3d 948, 950-52, 955-58 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).  See 
generally Vann v. State, 229 P.3d 197 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010) (collecting cases and thoroughly 
analyzing whether this “conduit limitation” serves the purposes of the Confrontation Clause). 
 215. Pendergrass v. Indiana, No. 09-866, 2010 WL 271330, at *30 (Jan. 19, 2010) (denying 
certiorari); see also People v. Dungo, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702, 713 n.14 (Ct. App. 2009) (“Where 
testimonial hearsay is involved, the Confrontation Clause trumps the rules of evidence.”), rev. 
granted and superseded by, 220 P.3d 240 (Cal. 2009). 
 216. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
 217. See Mnookin, supra note 19, at 816. 
 218. Id.; accord Julie A. Seaman, Triangulating Testimonial Hearsay:  The Constitutional 
Boundaries of Expert Opinion Testimony, 96 GEO. L.J. 828, 855-56 (2008) (“[I]t is not logically 
possible for a jury to use [factual-basis evidence] to assess the weight of the expert’s opinion other 
than by considering [its] truth.”). 
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practice may operate as a significant check on the practical costs of 
Melendez-Diaz. 
    * * * * * 
 What does this analysis tell us about those costs?  First, Justice 
Thomas’s “formality” requirement will limit the decision’s applicability 
to unsworn forensic reports.  Second, to the extent that reports consist of 
machine-generated, raw data, they will likely be unaffected, and the 
same goes for unsworn reports prepared by private, commercial 
laboratories.  Third, breathalyzer calibration records fall squarely within 
Melendez-Diaz’s holding, but relying on dicta in the majority opinion, 
most courts have concluded otherwise.  Fourth, much chain-of-custody 
evidence should likewise qualify as testimonial under Melendez-Diaz, 
though in practice this may result only in the exclusion of some 
standardized chain-of-custody forms.  And finally, because the decision 
applies only to hearsay, it does not foreclose the admission of non-
testifying analysts’ work product as the factual basis for a testifying 
expert’s opinion.   
In sum, Melendez-Diaz has the potential to affect a tremendous 
number of criminal cases, but mostly at the margins.  Drug cases aside, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that prosecutors rarely rely on hearsay alone 
to prove an essential element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Forensic analysts’ reports frequently supplement other evidence, so their 
exclusion would harm, but not hamstring, the prosecution’s case.  
Similarly, if prosecutors cannot prove every link in the chain of custody 
for real evidence, jurors will not automatically doubt the items’ 
authenticity.  And in terms of its persuasive effect on jurors, admission 
of an analyst’s report as factual-basis evidence, and not for its truth, will 
likely prove a distinction without a difference.  
Still, Melendez-Diaz surely means that more forensic analysts must 
take the witness stand.  Even when the substance of an analyst’s report is 
essentially uncontested—as in a drug case, where the defense is not that 
the drugs aren’t drugs—defendants will likely demand confrontation 
because doing so presents no drawbacks.  The prosecution must secure 
the analyst’s attendance and conduct a lengthy direct examination that 
may bore or annoy the jury.  Defense counsel need only prepare for a 
perfunctory cross-examination while hoping for a mistrial or a directed 
verdict should the analyst fail to appear.  Defense attorneys who 
consistently engage in such gamesmanship may irritate judges with busy 
calendars (not to mention the prosecutors they face), but judges can 
hardly fault the defendants for exercising their constitutional rights. 
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When a defendant demands confrontation of a forensic analyst, this 
should rarely prove to be a showstopper.219  The dissent’s fear that 
forensic analysts will often prove unable to “make it to the courthouse in 
time”220 is simply unwarranted.  Analysts may, on occasion, fall ill, have 
personal or professional commitments that conflict with trial, or “be 
unable to travel because of inclement weather.”221
B. Benefits 
  But the same can be 
said of all other prosecution witnesses.  Forensic analysts—many of 
whom are public employees—will likely prove more reliable, and easier 
for prosecutors to communicate with, than lay witnesses.  And while 
calling analysts to testify in court may draw them away from important 
public duties, and although they may occasionally be called to testify in 
more than one case on the same day, the same can be said of police 
officers.  Police officers manage to balance their investigatory duties 
with regular court appearances.  Forensic analysts can—and will—learn 
do the same. 
Implementing Melendez-Diaz will impose costs on government and 
the legal system, but ensuring that defendants consistently have the 
opportunity to cross-examine forensic analysts will yield countervailing 
benefits.  The Melendez-Diaz dissent’s contrary assertion rests on 
several false premises, and the majority’s brief riposte merely hints at 
the potential value of testing forensic analyses “in the crucible of cross-
 
 219. In a very few cases, forensic analysts will be genuinely unavailable.  Suppose, for 
example, that a medical examiner conducts an autopsy on a murder victim but dies long before 
police identify a suspect.  See Mnookin, supra note 19, at 851.  Under Melendez-Diaz, the 
examiner’s report may well be testimonial, and a new autopsy is, of course, impossible.  See id. at 
851-52 (arguing that in such a scenario, the autopsy results are testimonial under Crawford and 
must be entirely excluded, thereby unfairly rewarding the suspect for evading capture for so long); 
Carolyn Zabrycki, Comment, Toward a Definition of “Testimonial”: How Autopsy Reports Do Not 
Embody the Qualities of a Testimonial Statement, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1093, 1115 (2008) (arguing 
that a rule under which autopsy reports are testimonial would “effectively function[] as a statute of 
limitations for murder”). 
  Yet if the original examiner videotaped the autopsy process or took extensive photographs 
and measurements, a second medical examiner could review these materials as well as the deceased 
examiner’s report.  It seems plausible that photographs of bruise patterns, raw data from a 
toxicology screening, or other nontestimonial documentation could enable the second examiner to 
form entirely independent opinions.  Leaving aside the not-for-its-truth rationale for admission of 
the first examiner’s report, the second examiner could convey his opinion (and perhaps some of its 
factual basis) without disclosing any testimonial statements.  Even in this extreme hypothetical, 
Melendez-Diaz does not definitively foreclose the admission of crucial forensic evidence. 
 220. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2550 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 221. See id. 
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examination.”222  Confrontation’s fundamental purpose is “to ensure 
reliability of evidence,”223
1. Cross-examination can expose errors in forensic conclusions 
and flaws in the underlying forensic method. 
 which in turn serves the truth-seeking 
function of criminal trials.  Hence, to measure the potential benefits of 
Melendez-Diaz, one must consider whether, and how, cross-examination 
of forensic analysts will aid jurors in evaluating the reliability of forensic 
evidence.  In this section, I aim to answer those questions, framing my 
analysis as a response to four of the Melendez-Diaz dissent’s arguments. 
The dissent argues that cross-examination of forensic analysts will 
prove valueless because it will not “detect errors in scientific tests”; and 
that the defense should instead conduct a new test, or where a new test is 
impossible, call its own expert.224  As an initial matter, these proposed 
alternatives reflect wishful thinking.  “Some forensic analyses, such as 
autopsies and breathalyzer tests, cannot be repeated, and the specimens 
used for other analyses have often been lost or degraded.”225
More fundamentally, the dissent’s contention that cross-
examination cannot undermine the substance of forensic analyses is flat-
out wrong.  As the majority acknowledges, recent exoneration statistics 
demonstrate that “invalid forensic testimony” is a genuine, systemic 
problem
  And it is 
hardly plausible that courts will approve funding for indigent defendants 
to re-test a sample or retain an expert in every case in which the 
prosecution offers forensic evidence.  Indeed, the cost of doing so might 
well exceed the cost of securing live testimony from the analyst who 
conducted the original test. 
226—one that inquiry into forensic analysts’ methodologies may 
ameliorate.227
 
 222. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
  Defense counsel might explore, and the jury might benefit 
from hearing, how very little science lies behind most “forensic 
 223. Id. 
 224. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2547 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 225. Id. at 2536 n.5. 
 226. See id. at 2537. 
 227. See, e.g., id. at 2537 (noting that many forensic methodologies, including those followed 
by the laboratory analysts in Melendez-Diaz, “require[] the exercise of judgment and present[] a risk 
of error that might be explored on cross-examination”); Leading Cases, 123 HARV. L. REV. 202, 
210 (2009) (arguing that “the defendant has an interest in cross-examining a technician not just on 
the conduct of a particular test but on the methodology in general”); Burke, supra note 1, at 16 
(noting “the defendant’s interest in cross-examining a technician not just on implementation of one 
particular test, but rather on the methodology employed generally”). 
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sciences.”228  DNA analysis represents the gold standard among forensic 
disciplines.  Its courtroom application “is a fortuitous by-product” of 
rigorous research by scientists in academic and commercial 
laboratories.229  Its ability to individuate—to reliably associate an 
unknown sample to a particular person, to the exclusion of all others—
rests on theoretically and empirically sound biological explanations.230  
Its methodology minimizes “the chance of two different people 
matching,” and its error rates have been explored and documented.231  
“[T]he laboratory procedures are well specified,” and “there are clear 
and repeatable standards for analysis.”232  In sum, DNA analysis is 
scientific.  It is objective, it rests on a validated methodology, empirical 
tests have measured its accuracy, and analysts follow regular protocols.  
Few other forensic disciplines share these characteristics, and whatever 
else they may be called, these disciplines cannot fairly be called 
“sciences.”233
 
 228. “The law’s greatest dilemma in its heavy reliance on forensic science . . . concerns the 
question of whether—and to what extent—there is science in any given ‘forensic science’ 
discipline.”  See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 87, 107-08.  For many forensic disciplines, the 
answer would seem to be no.  See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, Where the Rubber Meets the Road:  
Thinking About Expert Evidence as Expert Testimony, 52 VILL. L. REV. 803, 808 (2007) (“Very 
little, if any, of what is called ‘forensic science’ consists of the sort of open-ended basic research 
that is classically the object of the philosophy of science.”); J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, 
Devil in a White Coat:  the Temptation of Forensic Evidence in the Age of CSI, 41 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 503, 520 (2007) (“At its core . . . forensic testing does not have an image problem; it has a 
science problem.  . . . [I]f forensic analysis is unable to achieve and document levels of validity and 
reliability, perhaps it should stop calling itself science.”).  According to the NRC Report: 
 
Although some of the techniques used by the forensic science disciplines—such as DNA 
analysis, serology, forensic pathology, toxicology, chemical analysis, and digital and 
multimedia forensics—are built on solid bases of theory and research, many other 
techniques have been developed heuristically.  That is, they are based on observation, 
experience, and reasoning without an underlying scientific theory, experiments designed 
to test the uncertainties and reliability of the method, or sufficient data that are collected 
and analyzed scientifically. 
NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 128. 
 229. See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 133; Erin Murphy, The New Forensics:  Criminal 
Justice, False Certainty, and the Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 721, 
730-31, 749 (2007).  Murphy cautions, however, that despite DNA’s general scientific robustness, 
its forensic application “lack[s] commercial or research analogs.”  Id. at 749. 
 230. See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 133. 
 231. See id. 
 232. See id. 
 233. See United States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
STEVENS_CONLAW_2010-2011.DOC 6/2/2011  1:50 PM 
2011] CRAWFORD’S LAST STAND? 125 
a.  Subjectivity 
Many forensic disciplines—including analysis of latent 
fingerprints, shoeprints, tire tracks, toolmarks,234 and bitemarks—
involve pattern comparisons.  But “[f]ew, if any, . . . have objective 
standards for deciding whether two patterns match.  That determination 
is left to the judgment of each examiner.”235  Fingerprint analysis, for 
example, entails visual comparison of an unknown print associated with 
a crime to the known print of a particular suspect or to a print retrieved 
from a database. 236  A “match” reflects the individual examiner’s 
conclusion, “based on his or her experience, that sufficient quantity and 
quality of . . . detail is in agreement.”237  There is no core set of 
characteristics that must agree, and no minimum number of details that 
must align, for an examiner to reach this conclusion.238  Hence, one 
examiner’s analysis may differ from that of his colleague—they may 
reach entirely different conclusions, or the same conclusion for entirely 
different reasons—and “experienced examiners do not necessarily agree 
with even their own past conclusions when the examination is presented 
in a different context some time later.”239
One might reasonably assume that when a forensic analyst’s 
conclusion rests on a subjective judgment, the prosecution will call that 
same analyst to testify, and the defendant will have an opportunity to 
cross-examine him.  This assumption would be false.  Before Melendez-
Diaz, statutes in various jurisdictions authorized prosecutors to introduce 
forensic certificates, without any live testimony, to “prove the results of 
DNA tests, microscopic hair analyses, fingerprint identifications, 
coroners’ reports, ballistics tests, and a wide range of other tests 
conducted by a crime laboratory.”
 
240
 
 234. “Toolmarks” are impressions “generated when a hard object (tool) comes into contact 
with a relatively softer object.”  NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 150. 
  And even where prosecutors did 
offer live testimony, some undoubtedly chose to present a courtroom-
savvy expert rather than the public crime-lab employee who conducted 
the analysis. 
 235. Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science 
Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 199, 200 (2008).   
 236. NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 138. 
 237. See id. 
 238. See id. at 139; Saks & Koehler, supra note 235, at 200. 
 239. NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 139; see also Saks & Koehler, supra note 235, at 201 
(describing the study). 
 240. Metzger, supra note 155, at 478. 
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Melendez-Diaz forecloses the former avenue for introducing an 
analyst’s testimony, and it ought to foreclose the latter as well.241
b.  Validity 
  In 
such cases, cross-examination of the original analyst will prove 
invaluable, as neither a sheet of paper nor a surrogate can fully 
illuminate the basis for another person’s subjective conclusion.  
Moreover, cross-examination can reveal to the jury—who might well 
have assumed otherwise—that the conclusion is subjective.  This fact is 
surely relevant to a rational factfinder’s assessment of the conclusion’s 
reliability and weight. 
Methodological validity is a threshold question for scientific 
disciplines.  At a very basic level, does the method actually work?  Is it 
feasible to answer this question about this initial data by following this 
process?  Scientists confirm a method’s validity for a particular purpose 
through validation studies.242  Such a study “begin[s] with a clear 
hypothesis (e.g., ‘new method X can reliably associate biological 
evidence with its source’)” and then tests it through an unbiased 
experiment designed to produce data potentially supporting or refuting 
the hypothesis.243  Publication of such studies in peer-reviewed journals 
then enables “experts in the field [to] review, question, and check the 
repeatability of the results.”244
For the vast majority of forensic-science disciplines, 
methodological validity remains unverified.
 
245  For example, while “it 
seems plausible that a careful comparison of two [fingerprints] can 
accurately discern whether or not they had a common source,” no 
empirical study has demonstrated that fingerprint analysts’ methodology 
can reliably associate prints from the same source.246
 
 241. See supra Part III.A.3.b. 
  Furthermore, like 
many other forensic-science methodologies, latent fingerprint analysis is 
 242. See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 113. 
 243. See id.   
 244. Id. at 114. 
 245. Craig M. Cooley, The CSI Effect: Its Impact and Potential Concerns, 41 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 471, 497 (2007) [hereinafter, Cooley, CSI Effect] (“[F]orensic science is and has been 
premised on almost no research for more than a century.”).  When validation studies have been 
conducted, some have discredited once-vaunted forensic disciplines, such as paraffin and gunshot 
residue testing.  See id. at 497-98.  Proponents of both methodologies claimed they could reliably 
determine whether a person had recently fired a gun.  Id. at 497-98. 
 246. See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 142-43.  See also id. at 154, 158, 167, 172 (pointing 
to an absence or dearth of validation studies in the fields of firearm, bitemark, and toolmark 
analysis, microscopic hair analysis, and forensic document examination).  
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premised on the idea that “no two sets of markings left by distinct 
objects can be indistinguishably alike.”247  Is this core uniqueness 
principle true?  Biological explanations exist for individual differences 
in DNA,248 but the same cannot be said of fingerprints, let alone 
shoeprints.  Personal experience cannot, by itself, prove the principle’s 
validity.249  Yet because most forensic-science disciplines have not 
bothered to scrutinize it, scant empirical evidence supporting (or 
refuting) the uniqueness hypothesis exists.250
In the latent fingerprint analysis field, “[s]ome scientific evidence 
supports the presumption that [prints] are unique to each person and 
persist unchanged throughout a lifetime.”
 
251  Even if that evidence were 
conclusive, however, uniqueness and persistence would be insufficient 
to validate fingerprint analysts’ methods.252
Uniqueness does not guarantee that prints from two different people 
are always sufficiently different that they cannot be confused, or that two 
impressions made by the same finger will also be sufficiently similar to 
be discerned as coming from the same source.  The impression left by a 
given finger will differ every time, because of inevitable variations in 
pressure, which change the degree of contact between each part of the 
ridge structure and the impression medium.  None of these 
variabilities—of features across a population of fingers or of repeated 
impressions left by the same finger—has been characterized, quantified, 
or compared.
 
253
That so many forensic disciplines rely on unvalidated methods does 
not necessarily mean that forensic evidence is unreliable bunk, but a 
rational fact-finder would surely take this information into account in 
weighing forensic evidence.  When the prosecution introduces a forensic 
analyst’s conclusions or data, jurors will likely assume that the 
 
 
 247. See Saks & Koehler, supra note 235, at 209.  Bitemark, handwriting, shoeprint, tiremark, 
and other forms of pattern analysis likewise endeavor to match an imprint left at the scene to a 
specific person or object.  See id. at 206.   
 248. NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 133. 
 249. See Saks & Koehler, supra note 235, at 212 (citing the famous “all swans are white” 
hypothesis: regardless of how many white swans one encounters, the sighting of a single black swan 
would disprove the hypothesis). 
 250. Id. at 210. 
 251. See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 143-44. 
 252. See id. at 144. 
 253. Id.  See also id. at 149 (noting absence of such population studies to support shoeprint and 
tiremark analysis); id. at 154-55 (noting dearth of support for uniqueness presumption in firearms 
and toolmark analysis); id. at 157-58 (describing flawed population study to support microscopic 
hair analysis); id. at 174 (noting absence of thorough population study to establish the uniqueness of 
bite marks). 
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underlying method does what it claims to do; otherwise, why would the 
judge admit it?254
c.  Accuracy 
  An opportunity to cross-examine the analyst will 
enable defense counsel to challenge this assumption.  Jurors may also be 
surprised to learn, for example, that while latent fingerprint analysts 
operate on the premise that no two individuals can leave identical prints, 
they don’t know for sure and haven’t bothered to confirm their 
assumption.  Such knowledge—gained from cross-examination of a 
fingerprint analyst—will aid jurors in deciding how much weight to give 
that analyst’s conclusions. 
All scientific methodologies are subject to various sources of 
error.255  Even when a method works, it will not produce accurate results 
100 percent of the time.  Thus, “[a] key task for . . . the analyst applying 
a scientific method to conduct a particular analysis[] is to identify as 
many sources of error as possible, to control or to eliminate as many as 
possible, and to estimate the magnitude of remaining errors so that the 
conclusions drawn . . . are valid.”256  Some errors will necessarily 
remain, and ascertaining a methodology’s error rate “requires rigorously 
developed and conducted scientific studies.”257  Scientists seek to 
document error rates in order to account for them when stating 
conclusions.258
“Unlike most scientific communities, [however,] the forensic 
science community does not openly” pursue detection and measurement 
of error rates.
 
259  In theory, a methodology that seeks to individuate 
evidence from an unknown source to a particular suspect can yield false 
positives and false negatives.260
 
 254. The existing rules governing admissibility of forensic evidence have failed to ensure that 
only evidence supported by a valid methodology gets to the jury.  See generally NRC REPORT, 
supra note 161, at 85-110 (discussing existing legal regime and identifying systemic features that 
have allowed preemptive judicial certification of forensic methodologies).  See also Murphy, supra 
note 229, at 755-74 (arguing that the criminal justice system is structurally incapable of 
distinguishing reliable from unreliable forensic evidence).  
  Yet the error rates for many forensic 
 255. See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 116. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. at 122. 
 258. See id. at 116-18. 
 259. See Craig M. Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community to Avert the Ultimate 
Injustice, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 393 (2004) [hereinafter, Cooley, Reforming the Forensic 
Science Community]. 
 260. See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 117-20. 
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disciplines are unknown.261  In the field of toolmark analysis, for 
example, “no statistical foundation for estimation of error rates 
exists.”262  Analysts in forensic disciplines for which error rates have not 
been studied often claim (implausibly) that their techniques are 
infallible.263  When error rates have been examined, results have varied.  
For example, studies have determined that over 97% of paint samples 
“could be differentiated based on microscopic examinations coupled 
with solubility and microchemical testing.”264  In contrast, a recent study 
of microscopic hair analysis revealed a 12.5% false positive rate.265
Cross-examination of a forensic analyst concerning a method’s 
error rate has an obvious value for the defense, and for the jury.  A bare 
certificate, or a black-and-white conclusion in a report admitted through 
another witness, presents a façade of absolute certainty.  In reality, 
though, the analyst’s techniques will sometimes produce the wrong 
answer, even when executed perfectly.  How frequently that happens—
or, as is more likely, that the analyst has no idea how often it happens—
should logically enter into a rational juror’s assessment of the 
conclusion’s reliability. 
 
d.  Regularity 
Whether a forensic analyst’s conclusion derives from the 
application of regularized protocols also bears on its reliability.  Do 
well-accepted standards and procedures exist such that each analyst 
follows the same process, in the same way, every time?  For some 
forensic-science disciplines, such as controlled-substance analysis, 
government-sponsored working groups have devised such standards.266
. . . would be acceptable in a scientific sense, if one’s goal were to 
identify and classify a completely unknown substance.”
  
Still, “[i]t is questionable whether all of the [recommended protocols]  
267
 
 261. Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community, supra note 259, at 397; accord 
DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 228, at 522. 
  Although 
some tests or combinations thereof can reliably identify unknown 
 262. NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 154. 
 263. Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community, supra note 259, at 393. 
 264. See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 170. 
 265. See id. at 160-61.  That study subjected eighty pairs of hairs that FBI examiners had 
“associated” through microscopic analysis to mitochondrial DNA testing.  See id.   Nine pairs had 
originated from different sources.  See id. at 161.  Earlier studies had produced fewer false positives 
but suffered from methodological and statistical flaws.  See id. at 157-58. 
 266. See id. at 135-36. 
 267. Id. at 136. 
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substances, the working group guidelines do not sufficiently explain 
which tests should be used for which tasks.268
For other disciplines, no overarching guidelines encourage 
procedural regularity.  A toolmark analysts’ professional group has 
proposed a threshold for association of a particular tool with a particular 
mark, but it has not identified the characteristics that examiners should 
look for or the process they should follow in comparing the tool and 
mark.
 
269  Similarly, although a bitemark examiners’ professional 
organization has issued guidelines for reporting bitemark comparisons, 
no standards exist “for the type, quality, and number of individual 
characteristics required to indicate that a bite mark has reached a 
threshold of evidentiary value.”270
As with subjectivity, validity, and accuracy, whether an analyst’s 
conclusion rests on regular procedures and standards regularly applied or 
an ad hoc examination of the evidence would, and should, influence a 
rational juror’s assessment of the conclusion’s reliability.  Certificates 
typically present an analyst’s conclusions without explaining how he 
reached them,
 
271
2. Cross-examination can prompt forensic analysts to retract, 
qualify or clarify their conclusions. 
 and while a surrogate expert can describe how he 
would have conducted an analysis, he may not know what the testing 
analyst actually did.  Cross-examination of the analyst, himself, 
however, can elicit this valuable information for the jury. 
The dissent insists that cross-examination of forensic analysts will 
prove a pointless formalism because “[i]t is not plausible that a 
laboratory analyst will retract his or her prior conclusions on catching 
sight of the defendant the result condemns.”272  This may be true of an 
honest analyst, the majority concedes, but “the same cannot be said of 
the fraudulent analyst.”273
 
 268. See id. 
  Furthermore, while outright fraud may be a 
relative rarity, confrontation may also combat two equally pernicious but 
far more common forensic-science phenomena:  overclaiming and non-
standardized, ambiguous terminology. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. at 176. 
 271. See id. at 186 (“The norm is to have no description of the methods of procedures used  
. . . .”). 
 272. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2548 (2009) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
 273. See id. at 2536 (majority opinion). 
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a.  Fraud 
Intentional fraud by forensic analysts is the exception, not the 
rule,274 but when it occurs, it unfailingly grabs headlines.275  Dishonest 
forensic analysts have reported results for tests they did not perform, 
concealed exculpatory results, fabricated evidence, and given false 
testimony.276  Other commentators have documented these scandals at 
length.277  It suffices to state that forensic fraud has tainted hundreds of 
cases and resulted in numerous wrongful convictions,278
The risk of fraud is perhaps the most compelling policy reason for 
recognizing a right to confront forensic analysts.  Cross-examination 
aims to unmask the false witness,
 and that further 
instances undoubtedly have yet to be uncovered. 
279 and like any other witness, a 
forensic analyst may lie in a pretrial statement.  Experience and common 
sense confirm that forensic analysts’ and laboratory technicians’ honesty 
cannot simply be taken for granted.  When an analyst commits fraud, a 
defendant has little hope of exposing it if the analyst’s written report is 
introduced either on its own or through another expert’s testimony.280
 
 274. NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 45. 
  
 275. See, e.g., Mary Flood, HPD Crime Lab Case Goes to the Jury, $35 Million at Stake for 
Wrongfully Convicted Man, HOUSTON CHRON., June 24, 2009, at B-3; Robert C. Herguth, Report 
Slams 80s Police Lab, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 14, 2001, at 5; Jay Rey, Chemist Admits to Falsifying 
Lab Report; Officials Discount Impact on Cases, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 28, 2009, at B1; Ben 
Schmitt & Joe Swickard, Detroit:  Troubled Crime Lab Shuttered; State Police Audit Results 
‘Appalling,’ Wayne County Prosecutor Declares, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 26, 2008, at 1; Kelly 
Thornton, Police Lab Accused of Sloppy Work, False Data, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 24, 
1997, at A-1. 
 276. See Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community, supra note 259, at 401. 
 277. Craig Cooley, for one, describes several notorious examples.  See id. at 401-08.     
 278. For instance, West Virginia State Police lab analyst Fred Zain’s practice of falsifying 
evidence threw more than 100 convictions into doubt, and at least ten of those convictions have 
since been overturned.  See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 44.  The Innocence Project has 
catalogued dozens of wrongful convictions based on intentional and unintentional laboratory errors.  
Innocence Project, Wrongful Convictions Involving Unvalidated or Improper Forensic Science that 
Were Later Overturned through DNA Testing, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/DNA_Exonerations_Forensic_Science.pdf (last visited Aug. 
11, 2010). 
 279. Indeed, Sir Walter Raleigh (unsuccessfully) sought to confront his accuser because 
Raleigh believed he would recant his lies if compelled to face the one they condemned.  See 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44 (2004). 
 280. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, hearsay declarants are subject to impeachment to 
the same extent as live witnesses.  See FED. R. EVID. 806.  The common impeachment techniques, 
however, all require that the defendant know of specific statements or conduct by the analyst that 
reflect poorly on the analyst’s credibility, or that the analyst have a poor reputation for truthfulness.  
See generally Fred Warren Bennett, How to Administer the “Big Hurt” in a Criminal Case:  the 
Life and Times of Federal Rule of Evidence 806, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 1135, 1141-63 (1995) 
(analyzing and providing examples of how defense counsel might impeach a hearsay declarant 
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But as with any other witness, an analyst may retreat from a deliberate 
fabrication when forced—thanks to Melendez-Diaz—to defend it under 
oath in the courtroom.281
b.  Overclaiming 
 
With far greater frequency than outright fraud, forensic analysts 
engage in overclaiming, exaggerating their conclusions’ probative 
value.282  Anecdotes abound.  Although “no empirical data exist on the 
frequency of hair characteristics,” one microscopic hair analyst testified 
that “the particular reddish-yellow hue of [the defendant’s] hair and the 
crime scene hair were found in ‘about 5 percent of the population.’”283  
And in a federal trial, a firearms examiner implausibly claimed that he 
could match six spent shell casings to a gun recovered more than a year 
later, “‘to the exclusion of every other firearm in the world.’”284
Baseless individualization claims like the latter one account for 
many instances of overclaiming.
 
285
 
using each of nine traditional methods).  Even if the defendant has somehow acquired this 
knowledge, a foundation witness or an expert who reviewed the analyst’s report may not have even 
met the analyst, and thus would be unable to confirm his statements or conduct.  The defendant 
would have to resort to extrinsic evidence, which might not be admissible.  See id. at 1154-56 
(noting that courts generally limit prior bad-acts impeachment to intrinsic evidence but that 
commentators have advocated allowing extrinsic evidence for impeachment of hearsay declarants). 
  As explained above, in no forensic-
science discipline other than DNA analysis has empirical research 
confirmed the uniqueness proposition that underpins individualization 
 281. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. at 2537 (citing Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 
1012, 1019 (1988)). 
 282. See Cole, supra note 228, at 817.  
 283. Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Testimony and Wrongful 
Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009).  See also NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 160 (noting that 
“several members of the committee have experienced courtroom cases in which, despite the lack of 
a statistical foundation, microscopic hair examiners have made probabilistic claims based on their 
experience”). 
 284. United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107 (D. Mass. 2005). 
 285. See Saks & Koehler, supra note 235, at 206 (noting that many toolmark, latent fingerprint, 
bitemark, handwriting, shoeprint and tiremark analysts, among others, make unsupportable 
individualization claims); Dawn McQuiston-Surrett & Michael J. Saks, Communicating Opinion 
Evidence in the Forensic Identification Sciences:  Accuracy and Impact, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1159, 
1159-60 (2008) (“With the principal exception of DNA typing, virtually all areas of forensic 
identification lack empirically and statistically meaningful measures of the probability that 
questioned crime-scene marks and known exemplars share a common origin.  Examiners are, at 
present, unable to compute random match probabilities; instead, they assume that the pool of 
candidates in the population, which can match as well or better than the known suspect, equals 
precisely one.  So, if they find two markings to be indistinguishably alike, they assume that they 
‘share a common origin’ ‘to the exclusion of all others in the world’ and that they have therefore 
‘identified the source.’”). 
STEVENS_CONLAW_2010-2011.DOC 6/2/2011  1:50 PM 
2011] CRAWFORD’S LAST STAND? 133 
claims.286  Yet overclaiming is pervasive.  It “has long been identified as 
a problem for microscopic hair comparison,”287 a field in which “the 
inability to individuate is recognized” but where analysts continue to 
profess having achieved it.288  It is “institutionalized” among latent 
fingerprint analysts, whose professional guidelines mandate that they 
make individualization conclusions even though “such claims are 
obviously unsustainable.”289
The prevalence of overclaiming supports affording defendants a 
right to cross-examine forensic analysts.  When an analyst’s inflated 
claims are introduced without his testimony, defense counsel can attempt 
to cast doubt on their accuracy by questioning the expert who repeats 
them in court (if there is one) or through extrinsic evidence (if it is 
admissible).  He cannot, however, prompt the analyst to qualify or recant 
his inflated claims—or to obstinately maintain them despite revelation of 
their shaky foundations, thereby diminishing his appearance of 
objectivity.  These ends can only be achieved on cross-examination of 
the analyst himself. 
 
c.  Terminology 
Even when a forensic analyst endeavors to report his findings 
without exaggeration, his word choice may convey a misleading 
impression of their probative value.  In some forensic-science 
disciplines, terminology varies among practitioners, so a testifying 
expert may interpret a conclusion in an analyst’s report very differently 
from how the analyst intended it.  Among shoeprint analysts, for 
example, a government-sponsored working group recommends the use 
of particular terms to indicate particular degrees of certainty in matching 
a crime-scene print to a known exemplar,290 but use of these 
recommended terms is not mandatory.291
 
 286. See supra pp. 51-53. 
  Similarly, the American Board 
of Forensic Odontologists (ABFO) has “issued guidelines for reporting 
bite mark comparisons, including the use of terminology for conclusion 
levels, but there is no incentive or requirement that these guidelines be 
 287. Cole, supra note 228, at 819. 
 288. Saks & Koehler, supra note 235, at 206. 
 289. Cole, supra note 228, at 820-21.  See also NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 141-42 
(noting that because population statistics for fingerprint characteristics do not exist, “the friction 
ridge community actively discourages its members from testifying in terms of the probability of a 
match,” leading examiners to use the language of absolute certainty). 
 290. See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 148.   
 291. See id. at 149-50. 
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used in the criminal justice system.”292  In other disciplines, such as 
paint analysis, no guidelines for report wording presently exist.293
Ambiguous terminology can lead one expert to misread the 
certainty of another’s conclusion, but jurors are even more likely to be 
misled.  ABFO’s recommended terminology is illustrative.  AFBO 
standards offer four levels of certainty, from “reasonable scientific 
certainty,” which indicates a certain individualization with no reasonable 
probability of error, down to “match,” which indicates general similarity, 
but no more than for a large percentage of the population.
 
294  In a survey 
of 183 undergraduate students, “jurors” interpreted “reasonable scientific 
certainty” as indicating 70.7% certainty, and “match” as indicating 86% 
certainty, reversing the terms’ order and assigning a very high level of 
certainty to a term intended to convey only general similarity.295  As the 
study authors conclude, “[f]orensic expert witnesses cannot simply adopt 
a term, define for themselves what they wish it to mean, and expect 
judges and juries to understand what they mean by it.”296
Terminology “can have a profound effect on how the trier of fact  
   
. . . perceives and evaluates evidence.”297
3. Forensic analysts are not immune from bias. 
  Cross-examination—and only 
cross-examination—can overcome linguistic ambiguities.  The jury or 
another expert who testifies in court can easily misinterpret a written 
certificate or report that, for example, states a “match” without 
elaboration.  If permitted to cross-examine the analyst who prepared the 
report, however, defense counsel can compel him to clarify his meaning, 
possibly giving the jury an entirely different understanding of the 
certainty of the analyst’s conclusion. 
The dissent insists that forensic analysts will not deviate from their 
conclusions on cross-examination because they are disinterested 
neutrals,298
 
 292. Id. at 175. 
 yet the majority suggests two reasons to believe the reverse.  
First, many forensic laboratories are administered by or closely affiliated 
with law enforcement agencies, and the need to answer particular 
 293. See id. at 169. 
 294. McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, supra note 285, at 1161-62. 
 295. Id. at 1162. 
 296. Id. at 1163. 
 297. NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 185. 
 298. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2548 (2009) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
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questions in particular criminal cases drives much of their work.299  
Second, law enforcement officials who request forensic analyses may 
subtly (or not so subtly) influence analysts’ conclusions.300
a.  Law Enforcement Affiliation 
 
With the exception of DNA analysis, most forensic-science 
techniques were developed for the specific purpose of solving crimes, 
and they “rarely find analogues in academic or commercial settings.”301  
“[T]he government not only creates forensic science, but also almost 
exclusively executes forensic procedures.”302  In the majority of forensic 
laboratories, the laboratory supervisor reports to the head of a law 
enforcement agency.303  Law enforcement controls the laboratory’s 
budget, and administratively, analysts work for the police.304  This 
relationship imposes “[c]ultural pressures” on forensic analysts to 
advance the law enforcement mission.305  In essence, analysts and 
technicians in public laboratories are service providers, with law 
enforcement as their principal or even sole client.306  They may come to 
“view themselves not as neutral investigators, but as ‘police in lab 
coats,’ part of the police [effort] to convict the suspect.”307  In some 
forensic fields, analysts are police in lab coats: “the vast majority of 
firearms and fingerprint examiners . . . are sworn law enforcement 
officers.”308
Forensic analysts’ law enforcement affiliation creates an alarming 
potential for bias.  If a police officer ultimately signs off on an analyst’s 
performance evaluation or determines whether he will receive a pay 
raise, the analyst has a strong incentive to keep that officer happy.  A 
written report cannot disclose the organizational details that give rise to 
this incentive, but a canny defense counsel will bring them out on cross-
 
 
 299. See id. at 2536 (majority opinion). 
 300. See id. 
 301. See Murphy, supra note 229, at 745-46. 
 302. Id. at 746. 
 303. NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 183. 
 304. See id. at 183-84.   
 305. See id. at 184.  
 306. See Murphy, supra note 229, at 748 (arguing that “[f]orensic scientists often feel the 
pressure to produce results that will please their central and even sole client, the government”); 
Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community, supra note 259, at 398 (arguing that forensic 
analysts’ service-provider role discourages self-criticism so long as the client is pleased). 
 307. See DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 228, at 515. 
 308. Cooley, CSI Effect, supra note 245, at 481; accord NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 136 
(“In some agencies, fingerprint examiners are also required to respond to crime scenes and can be 
sworn officers who also perform police officer/detective duties”). 
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examination.  The analyst will almost certainly profess his operational 
independence and insist that he is an unbiased neutral.309
b.  Cognitive Bias 
  Cognizant of 
the analyst’s relationship to law enforcement, the jury may then judge 
whether his claims of neutrality—and by extension, his conclusions—
are credible. 
Various cognitive biases influence human judgments in everyday 
life,310 and analysts cannot simply leave them at the laboratory door.  
Cross-examination may prove ineffectual at exposing many such biases 
because their effect is primarily subconscious, yet one form of cognitive 
bias can be uncovered in the courtroom.  How a question is framed or 
the context in which data are presented can affect a person’s answer to 
that question or the conclusion he reaches from those data.311  For 
example, an eyewitness called to view a line-up may assume that the 
perpetrator must be among those presented and, unless cautioned, will 
choose the “best” of the available alternatives.312  In the forensic-science 
arena, context bias can arise when an analyst is aware, even 
subconsciously, that law enforcement expects or desires a particular 
outcome.313  Indeed, police officers often communicate their 
expectations to analysts directly.  Requests for forensic testing typically 
include a narrative that explains the requester’s theory of events and 
details inculpatory information about the suspect, thereby framing the 
analyst’s work as an effort to confirm the theory.314
 
 309. See DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 228, at 515 (quoting high-ranking officials in public 
forensic laboratories as insisting that they hold no pro-prosecution bias). 
  Such information 
 310. NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 122.  These influences include the desire to please 
others; the tendency to become more confident in a preliminary conclusion over time, and to thus 
ignore new and contradictory information; the tendency to rely too heavily on a single piece of 
information, often among the first encountered, when making decisions; the tendency to ignore 
base-rate statistics in assessing the probative value of information; and the tendency to see patterns 
that do not exist.  See id. at 122-24. 
 311. Id. at 122. 
 312. Id. at 122-23. 
 313. See Cooley, CSI Effect, supra note 245, at 487.  Forensic analysts’ practices may 
compound this problem.  If an analyst compares evidence found at a crime-scene only to an 
exemplar from a suspect and not to a pool of samples, this predisposes the analyst to identify 
similarities between the two.  See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 123.  Forensic odontologists, in 
particular, typically compare a bite mark only to “dental casts of an individual or individuals of 
interest” and rarely make comparisons to “models from other individuals.”  Id. at 174.   
 314. See DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 228, at 516-17; Cooley, CSI Effect, supra note 245, at 
488.  In one Texas case, for example, police requesting DNA tests in a homicide investigation 
provided a detailed memorandum naming the child victim and caregiver-suspect, and explaining the 
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can alter an analyst’s conclusions.  In a series of studies, researchers 
Dror and Charlton found that when contextual information was 
introduced, experienced fingerprint examiners reached different 
conclusions on reexamination of fingerprint pairs they had previously 
analyzed.315
Cross-examination cannot reveal, definitively, whether context bias 
affected a forensic analyst’s judgment, but counsel can at least inquire 
about whether police officers provided contextual information to the 
analyst.  Jurors may learn that the analyst considered only the defendant 
as a possible source of biological material found at the crime scene; that 
officers provided the analyst with a detailed theory of the case before the 
analyst concluded that evidence inculpated the defendant; or that the 
analyst performed his work in a neutral vacuum.  Whatever information 
is unearthed about the context in which the analyst reached his 
conclusions, it will better enable the jury to evaluate the reliability of 
those conclusions. 
 
4. Forensic analysts will recall information relevant to the 
particular test or defendant. 
The dissent asserts that cross-examination of forensic analysts will 
prove fruitless because the analyst “will not remember [having 
conducted] a particular test or the link it had to the defendant.”316  As 
argued above, cross-examination concerning an analyst’s 
methodology—a subject on which his memory is unlikely to fail—will 
aid the jury in evaluating the reliability of an individual test result.  
Moreover, as with any expert witness, “an analyst’s lack of proper 
training or deficiency in judgment may be disclosed in cross-
examination.”317
 
investigating officer’s theory of how the child’s death had occurred.  See Cuadros-Fernandez v. 
State, 316 S.W.3d 645, 655 (Tex. App. 2009).   
  An analyst will not suffer from lack of memory as to 
his education, training, and performance on proficiency tests—all of 
 315. See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 123 (describing study in which information such as 
“suspect confessed to the crime” was provided along with instructions accompanying prints, and in 
which examiners reached different conclusions in 6 of 24 examinations); Saks & Koehler, supra 
note 235, at 201 (describing two studies, one in which 4 of 5 experts who had previously matched 
prints reached different conclusions after learning the prints came from different people, and one in 
which contextual information induced 4 of 6 examiners to reach different conclusions about at least 
1 of 8 pairs of prints they had previously matched). 
 316. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2548 (2009) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
 317. Id. at 2537 (majority opinion). 
STEVENS_CONLAW_2010-2011.DOC 6/2/2011  1:50 PM 
138 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLICY [2:81 
which will inform a rational assessment of his conclusions in a particular 
case. 
a.  Education 
Most forensic laboratories require that new hires in most disciplines 
possess at least a bachelor’s degree, if not a higher degree, though an 
associate degree may be acceptable for firearms, document, and 
fingerprint analysts.318  Still, 96% of forensic analysts hold only 
bachelor’s or associate degrees,319 and “the vast majority of firearms and 
fingerprint examiners do not . . . possess an undergraduate degree of any 
kind.”320
Most laboratories also require that applicants hold degrees in 
forensic science or a natural science, and “[o]ver the years, most crime 
laboratory hires have been and continue to be graduates with degrees in 
chemistry or biology.”
 
321  “It is the exception and not the norm,” 
however, “when a forensic practitioner holds a graduate degree—
especially a doctorate degree—in a natural or physical science.”322  A 
degree in forensic science suffices for employment at most 
laboratories,323 yet no nationwide standards exist for forensic-science 
programs.324  Their curricula “range from rigorous scientific coursework 
. . . to little more than criminal justice degrees with an internship.”325  
Indeed, “‘it is possible to earn a degree called ‘Masters in Forensic 
Science’ without ever having set foot in a laboratory or even having 
taken a core curriculum of hard science classes.’”326  Similarly, although 
conclusions in most forensic disciplines rest on a statistical basis, few 
forensic-science curricula include even a single statistics course.327
When a forensic analyst’s “scientific” conclusion is introduced into 
evidence, the extent of that analyst’s education in science (and statistics) 
 
 
 318. NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 220-21. 
 319. DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 228, at 522.  See also Murphy, supra note 229, at 746 
(noting that “technicians who hold no more than an undergraduate degree staff many police crime 
laboratories”). 
 320. Cooley, CSI Effect, supra note 245, at 481. 
 321. NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 221.  Explosives and paint analysts, in particular, 
typically have extensive science backgrounds.  Id. at 168, 170. 
 322. Cooley, CSI Effect, supra note 245, at 482. 
 323. NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 223. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Cooley, CSI Effect, supra note 245, at 482 (quoting KEITH INMAN & NORAH RUDIN, 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF CRIMINALISTICS:  THE PROFESSION OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 303-04 
(2001)). 
 327. Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community, supra note 259, at 428. 
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is plainly relevant to the conclusion’s reliability.  The odds are slim that 
a written certificate or report will describe the author’s education, and an 
expert witness who bases his opinion on the report is unlikely to know 
this information.  Only cross-examination of the analyst can provide 
these valuable details to the jury. 
b.  Training 
Many laboratory accreditation and individual certification programs 
require that analysts receive discipline-specific training and pass a 
competency test before working independently, and that they satisfy 
continuing education requirements.328  But “[t]here is no uniformity in 
the certification of forensic practitioners . . . .  Indeed, most jurisdictions 
do not require forensic practitioners to be certified, and most forensic 
disciplines have no mandatory certification programs.”329  Even where 
certification is required, minimum requirements may not include “an 
understanding of the scientific basis of the examinations . . . [or] the use 
of a scientific method.”330  Training of latent fingerprint examiners, for 
example, varies widely, and “not all agencies require [them] to achieve 
and maintain certification.”331
Similarly, “accreditation of crime laboratories is not required in 
most jurisdictions.”
 
332  A 2005 survey of publicly-funded crime 
laboratories found that 81% had achieved accreditation, with state-
operated laboratories (91%) scoring far higher than their county (67%) 
or municipal (62%) counterparts.333  Still, many forensic entities—in 
particular, latent fingerprint examination units—operate independently 
from crime laboratories, and these units do not, and are not required to, 
participate in accreditation programs.334
As with education, a forensic analyst’s training and certification 
status, as well as the accreditation status of the laboratory or other 
facility for which he works, are topics relevant to the credibility of his 
conclusions and on which failure of memory is unlikely.  And as with 
   
 
 328. See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 231. 
 329. Id. at 6. 
 330. Id. at 147-48 (discussing shoeprint and tiremark analysis). 
 331. Id. at 137. 
 332. Id. at 6. 
 333. Id. at 199-200.  But cf. DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 228, at 518 (reporting that as of 
February 2007, only 330 of more than 1000 crime laboratories throughout the United States had 
achieved accreditation). 
 334. See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 200. 
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education, only cross-examination of the analyst himself will provide 
comprehensive information on these subjects to the jury. 
c.  Proficiency 
As of 2002, 274 of 351 publicly-funded forensic laboratories 
engaged in proficiency testing, but almost all used “declared” tests, in 
which the analyst knows he is being tested.335  Externally-designed, 
closed tests using “realistic case samples” (which allow for performance 
comparisons across laboratories, and in which the analyst does not know 
he is being evaluated) “are virtually nonexistent,”336 and laboratories 
seldom publish their results.337
Whether an analyst has undergone recent proficiency tests—and if 
so, how they were designed, and how he performed on them—would 
inform a rational factfinder’s reliability assessment of the analyst’s 
conclusions.  This information is particularly crucial in the many 
disciplines that involve subjectivity or in which analysts rely principally 
on their experience.  If an analyst concludes that a crime scene 
fingerprint and the defendant’s print so resemble one another that they 
could not have originated from different sources, this conclusion’s 
reliability depends heavily on that analyst’s judgment.  And the quality 
of that judgment can be evaluated only based on how often he’s right.  In 
most real-world scenarios, one cannot know with certainty whether a 
“match” conclusion was correct.  So, the analyst’s proficiency must be 
judged, if at all, by how he performs when analyzing exemplars known 
(to a test administrator, not the analyst) to originate from the same 
source or from different sources.  As with education and training, 
affording the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the analyst is 
the surest way to get this information before the jury. 
 
   * * * * *  
In sum, cross-examination of forensic analysts will not be pointless.  
On the contrary, it can make invaluable contributions to jurors’ ability to 
rationally evaluate forensic evidence. 
First, cross-examination can expose forensic analyses as subjective 
and/or based on unvalidated methodologies with unknown accuracy 
rates and without standardized protocols.  Objectivity, validity, accuracy, 
and regularity are all fundamental characteristics of science—and 
 
 335. Id. at 207-08. 
 336. Saks & Kohler, supra note 235, at 202. 
 337. Murphy, supra note 229, at 747. 
STEVENS_CONLAW_2010-2011.DOC 6/2/2011  1:50 PM 
2011] CRAWFORD’S LAST STAND? 141 
science has a talismanic effect on juries.  Expert evidence can be 
particularly powerful.338  When labeled as “science,” it can assume an 
aura of “mystic infallibility.”339  Popular culture, particularly television 
programs that glorify forensic science and present it as an infallible 
crime-solving tool, reinforces jurors’ instinctive trust in “science.”340  
Accordingly, jurors tend to overestimate the probative value of forensic 
evidence, “putting greater weight on such evidence than its statistical 
value warrants.”341
Second, cross-examination may prompt a forensic analyst to retract, 
qualify, or modify his conclusions.  Scholars and the mainstream media 
have extensively documented instances of fraud in the forensic sciences, 
and like any other dishonest witness, a forensic analyst may recant when 
forced to defend his conclusions in the “crucible of cross-examination.”  
Moreover, while fraud remains a relative rarity, exaggerated and 
ambiguous conclusions are all too common.  When an analyst succumbs 
to overclaiming, cross-examination can prompt him to qualify his 
conclusions, revealing the uncertainty of his individualization claim or 
that a stated population statistic is merely an educated guess.  And when 
an analyst frames his conclusion in ambiguous terms, cross-examination 
can compel him to clarify his meaning for the jury.  For example, this 
  In reality, however, most forensic-science 
disciplines are not very scientific.  Exposure of their flaws through 
cross-examination will enable the jury to assess forensic evidence more 
comprehensively, and perhaps more importantly, it may dispel the 
illusion that such evidence is, in fact, science. 
 
 338. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993); United States v. 
Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 339. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974).  See also Saby Ghoshray, 
Untangling the CSI Effect In Criminal Jurisprudence:  Circumstantial Evidence, Reasonable Doubt, 
and Jury Manipulation, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 533, 547-53 (2007) (theorizing that reliance on 
supposedly objective, scientific evidence reduces jurors’ cognitive stress and enables them to reach 
verdicts more easily). 
 340. See generally Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt:  Managing Truth 
and Justice in Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050 (2006) (examining the “CSI Effect,” a 
phenomenon by which the television program CSI is said to influence jury decision-making); 
Michael Mann, The “CSI Effect”:  Better Jurors Through Television and Science?, 24 BUFF. PUB. 
INT. L.J. 211 (2006) (also examining the “CSI Effect,” and discussing other media and cultural 
influences that condition jurors to implicitly trust in science). 
 341. Tyler, supra note 340, at 1063; accord DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 228, at 527-28; 
Leading Cases, supra note 227, at 208-09.  But cf. Wendy Brickell, Is It the CSI Effect, or Do We 
Just Distrust Juries?, 23 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 11, 16-17 (2008) (arguing that multiple empirical 
studies have debunked the notion that jurors instinctively defer to expert witnesses);  Dale A. Nance 
& Scott B. Morris, Juror Understanding of DNA Evidence:  An Empirical Assessment of 
Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence with a Relatively Small Random-Match Probability, 34 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 395, 400-01, 418-19 (2005) (reporting results of empirical study and concluding that 
participants had undervalued DNA match statistics relative to Bayesian norms). 
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may reveal that by “match,” the analyst intended to imply only some 
similarity, not an individualization, or that by “probable,” he meant only 
more likely than not.  Thus, cross-examination can leave the jury with a 
deeper, and perhaps very different, understanding of the analyst’s 
conclusions. 
Third, although “far removed” from the defendant and the crime,342
Finally, forensic analysts should have no trouble recalling the 
details of their education, training, and performance on proficiency tests, 
all of which are relevant to each individual case in which they render 
conclusions.  Whether the analyst holds a Ph.D in chemistry or an 
associate’s degree in criminal justice may profoundly affect the jury’s 
trust in his expertise.  Likewise, whether the analyst holds a professional 
certification, whether he works at an accredited facility, and whether he 
regularly undergoes and performs well on proficiency tests will all 
contribute to how a rational factfinder weighs that analyst’s conclusions. 
 
a forensic analyst is no more immune from bias than any other witness.  
His law enforcement affiliation may give him an indirect interest in the 
outcome of his analysis, and contextual information may have skewed 
his conclusions.  Exposing the facts giving rise to bias, actual or 
apparent, is one fundamental purpose of cross-examination, and it can 
fulfill this purpose just as effectively with forensic analysts as with 
percipient witnesses. 
Melendez-Diaz has made possible cross-examination and 
consequent education of the jury on all of these subjects.  Thus, 
Melendez-Diaz promises to greatly enhance the reliability of verdicts 
based on forensic evidence. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts foreshadows the end of an 
ambitious originalist experiment within constitutional criminal 
procedure.  Constitutional law typically advances by increments.  
Against the backdrop of 200 years of jurisprudence, both stare decisis 
and deference to the political branches ensure that only on exceedingly 
rare occasions will the Court wipe the slate clean and start anew in 
interpreting a constitutional provision.  Yet in Crawford, the Court did 
just that, announcing a simple and elegant rule that would, in theory, 
both constrain judicial discretion and honor the Framers’ intent. 
 
 342. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2548 (2009) (Kennedy J., 
dissenting). 
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In Melendez-Diaz, that theoretically appealing rule collided with 
reality.  The Court carried Crawford to its logical conclusion, albeit one 
that even some of its initial supporters had evidently failed to foresee.  
That conclusion’s real-world ramifications so alarmed four members of 
the Court that they implicitly repudiated Crawford, leaving it with the 
unqualified support of only four—now, two—Justices.  Regardless of 
where Justices Sotomayor and Kagan stand on the issue, no five 
members of the Court now agree on which hearsay statements implicate 
the Confrontation Clause.  Melendez-Diaz thus marks the end of 
Crawford’s advance. 
Although the basic Crawford rule now lacks majority support, the 
Court has not overruled it.  Thus, the “testimonial statements” doctrine 
lives on, but Crawford’s simple and elegant rule seems destined to grow 
ever more complicated and unwieldy.  Suppose that the two newest 
Justices share their predecessors’ views, and that those who silently 
joined the Melendez-Diaz majority and dissent wholeheartedly agree 
with the ideas advanced in those opinions.  If so, then in a future case, 
the Court would find a hearsay statement to implicate the Confrontation 
Clause only if it is testimonial under Crawford and Davis, and only if 
either the declarant is a conventional witness, or the statement bears 
sufficient indicia of formality.  Although the Court has defined none of 
these concepts—testimonial statements, indicia of formality, and 
conventional witnesses—with any precision, this “testimonial-plus” rule 
would likely prove easier for lower courts to apply than the alternative.  
That is, if the three-way split evinced by Melendez-Diaz does not 
adequately capture the diversity of opinion on the Court as to which 
hearsay statements trigger the confrontation right, then the future likely 
holds only a muddle of fact-bound decisions.  The Crawford Court 
sought to impose certainty and predictability on an area of constitutional 
law previously characterized by boundless judicial discretion.  
Ironically, the future direction of the Court’s jurisprudence in that area is 
now anything but certain. 
Melendez-Diaz may thus herald Crawford’s demise, but at the same 
time, it represents Crawford’s zenith.  Crawford itself profoundly 
changed criminal practice.  Melendez-Diaz will almost certainly do the 
same.  Before, the vast majority of jurisdictions authorized prosecutors 
to introduce forensic analyses through sworn certificates.  Now, in most 
cases, if the defendant objects (as he very likely will), prosecutors must 
present live testimony or else forego use of highly persuasive forensic 
evidence.   
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In the short run, implementing this rule will impose tremendous 
costs on the criminal justice system.  Thanks to several inherent 
limitations on the decision’s scope, Melendez-Diaz will not affect all 
forensic evidence.  Yet because prosecutors rely on such evidence in so 
very many cases, demand for forensic analysts’ live testimony will still 
increase dramatically.  Early empirical evidence supports this 
conclusion.  As one recent essay reports, subpoenas to forensic analysts 
in Virginia criminal trials jumped from a monthly average of 528 in the 
nine months before Melendez-Diaz to 1885 in July, the month directly 
after the decision issued; 1737 in August; 1631 in September; and 1441 
in October.343
Over time, however, government and governmental actors will 
adapt, as they have to the Court’s past constitutional criminal procedure 
decisions.  The downward trend in defendants’ subpoenas to Virginia 
forensic analysts illustrates this point.  The aforementioned essay’s 
authors posit that prosecutors’ gradual acceptance of—and submission 
to—defendants’ increased leverage in plea negotiations may account for 
the decline in subpoenas from their July peak.
  These numbers reflect the experience of only one state 
over a very brief period, but they are staggering.  Public crime 
laboratories already face backlogs.  Melendez-Diaz will magnify this 
problem as analysts struggle to balance their laboratory duties with trial 
schedules.  Additionally, in most jurisdictions budgetary constraints will 
preclude hiring additional staff to cope with these new demands. 
344
Moreover, the decision’s costs are not without corresponding 
benefits.  Forensic evidence is a ubiquitous feature of criminal trials.  As 
with any other type of evidence, we expect jurors to rationally assess its 
probative value before applying it to their verdict.  Yet, we have long 
asked them to make these assessments without any foundation.  As a 
general matter, jurors tend to overestimate the probative value of 
  Just as prosecutors will 
adapt to the new regime, so, too, will public crime laboratories.  They 
will devise and adopt new procedures and organizational structures to 
facilitate analysts’ availability and readiness for in-court testimony, and 
if necessary, they will shift or obtain funds to hire additional personnel.  
The criminal justice system will eventually reach a new equilibrium, at 
which more forensic analysts take the stand and the average plea 
agreement is a bit more favorable to the defendant.  Melendez-Diaz will 
impose costs, but it does not spell the end of either forensic evidence or 
criminal prosecutions. 
 
 343. Murphy & Brown, supra note 124, at 98. 
 344. See id. 
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forensic evidence, treating it as inherently credible, objective “science.”  
Yet most forensic sciences involve very little science and only very 
rarely are their practitioners truly scientists.  Instead, inadequately-
educated technicians of unknown competence populate many forensic 
disciplines, applying unvalidated methodologies with unknown error 
rates and irregular procedures to reach subjective conclusions.  Further, 
while many forensic analysts may not be scientists, they are all human, 
and like all others, they may lie, exaggerate, communicate their ideas 
unclearly, or harbor bias.  And yet, before Melendez-Diaz, many 
jurisdictions authorized prosecutors to introduce analysts’ bare 
conclusions through sworn certificates without any accompanying live 
testimony.  One could hardly expect jurors to rationally evaluate forensic 
evidence in such an information vacuum. 
Melendez-Diaz promises to change this situation for the better.  
Cross-examination of forensic analysts can yield a wealth of valuable 
information for the jury, enabling them to do more than simply take 
forensic conclusions at face value.  Jurors may have an opportunity to do 
what their job requires:  to examine the various circumstances 
surrounding a piece of evidence, weigh those circumstances, and 
conclude whether and how much to rely on the evidence in deciding the 
ultimate question of guilt or innocence.  Enhancing the reliability of the 
evidence on which a verdict rests will enhance the reliability of the 
verdict itself.  Cross-examination of forensic analysts will serve the 
truth-seeking function of criminal trials and fundamental fairness. 
Of course, cross-examination’s value in a particular trial depends 
on defense counsel’s effectiveness.  Melendez-Diaz guarantees only that 
a defendant may demand live testimony from a forensic analyst.  He 
need not do so, and if he does, defense counsel may fail to elicit relevant 
information about the analyst’s methods and qualifications.  Many 
crime-lab horror stories have emerged through independent 
investigations, not when forensic analysts admitted to fraud or 
incompetence under withering cross-examination.345  Moreover, giving 
jurors the requisite information to thoroughly and rationally evaluate the 
reliability of forensic evidence does not ensure that they will use it.346
 
 345. See Jennifer E. Laurin, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, Rodriguez v. City of Houston, 
and Remedial Rationing, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 82, 87 (2009) (citing several examples). 
  
 346. At least with respect to DNA, some empirical research suggests that information elicited 
on cross-examination of forensic analysts has little to no effect on jurors’ decisions.  See Nance & 
Morris, supra note 341, at 433-35 (2005) (finding that informing jurors of a DNA laboratory’s error 
rate through cross-examination of a DNA analyst had no statistically significant effect on jurors’ 
willingness to convict, and theorizing that jurors rationally discount DNA match probabilities based 
on an assumed risk of lab error).  Cf. Shari Seidman Diamond et. al., Juror Reactions to Attorneys at 
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Nevertheless, if reliable verdicts based on reliable evidence are the goal 
of criminal trials, then Melendez-Diaz is a welcome step in the right 
direction. 
 
Trial, 87 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 17 (1996) (finding that strong cross-examination of 
prosecution psychiatrist had an immediate, positive effect on jurors’ perceptions of defense counsel 
but no effect on their ultimate verdict or verdict confidence measures); Margaret Bull Kovera et. al., 
Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases:  Effects of Expert Evidence Type and Cross-
Examination, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 653 (1994) (finding that cross-examination of prosecution 
expert on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome had no significant effect on jurors’ 
reliability assessments). 
